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EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS, THE TREATY-MAKING
CLAUSE, AND STRICT CONSTRUCTIONISM*
I
It is often the case that the strongest points supporting one's claim
can become the very basis for the strongest arguments against it. So
it is when the arguments justifying presidential power to enter into
executive agreements are examined.1 A "strict construotion" of the
Constitution, be it an interpretation either in terms of the intent of the
Framers, or a search for the meaning of the words actually employed,2
affords no basis of support for expanded executive prerogatives in the
area of foreign relations. The Constitution is explicit in its terms de-
lineating the powers assigned to each branch of government, and fidel-
ity to those terms, the tenet of "strict constructionism," leads one to
doubt, if not reject, the claims made for adaptation through use and
practice.3
Leading advocates of expanding presidential power, albeit writing
a number of years prior to the new wave of literal interpretation of
the Constitution, would no doubt reject -the legal philosophy of an ad-
ministration that seemingly implements -the very proposals they de-
mand. Specifically, McDougal and Lans decry the restrictions placed
on the President by the many who "have followed the Pied Pipers of
strict constructionism in attempting a literal construction of a non-
existent text . . . ." While fidelity to the Constitution demands no
less than the acceptance of the words it contains, one must certainly
* The author wishes to express his indebtedness and appreciation to Professor C.
Herman Pritchett for his remarks on an earlier draft of this Comment.
1. The major concern of this Comment is to deal with "sole" executive agreements,
i.e., those agreements that are entered into by the President alone under powers sup-
posedly found in the Constitution.
2. See C. MiER, Tim SuPREVME COURT AND THE UsEs op IsTORY 153-54 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as MiLLER]. See generally Dworkin, The Jurisprudence of Richard
Nixon, N.Y. Rlv. op Booxs, May, 1972, at 26 [hereinafter cited as Dworkin]; text
accompanying note 227 infra.
3. The most extensive claim for such an interpretation is found in McDougal & Lans,
Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable In-
struments of National Policy (pts. 1 & 2), 54 YALE L.J. 1.81, 534 (1945) [hereinafter
cited as Treaties]. The most restrictive view of the President's power to make executive
agreements can be found in Fraser, Treaties and Executive Agreements, S. Doc. No.
244, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944).
4. Treaties, supra note 3, at 217.
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start with the assumption that such a text exists before an interpretation
is attempted.
No less interesting is the following statement by McClure:
Certainly the specified rule regarding treaties has not heretofore been
construed as denying or disparaging the right of the President to retain
his inheritance from the government under the Articles of Confederation
and British constitutional practice of using executive agreements in the
conduct of international relations. 5
A strong expounder of executive agreements, McClure not only would
deny a literal construction of the Constitution, but also would advocate
fidelity to a text that was conclusively reformed because of weaknesses
in the field of foreign relations,0 as well as supporting a practice that
was definitely a point of contention with Great Britain at the time of
the American Revolution.
A theme which dominates those writers who simply pay the piper
to play another ,tune is that the constitutional text "permits what it does
not prohibit."" Thus, one finds that "the Constitution does not provide
5. W. McCLuRE, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS 279 (1941) (emphasis
added) [hereinafter cited as AGREEMETS].
6. On a general level, the call for a federal constitutional convention was made "for
the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation. . .to . . . ren-
der the federal constitution adequate to the exigencies of Government & the preservation
of the Union." 3 M. FARAND, THm REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
14 (rev. ed. 1937). Fortunately, this point did not escape McDougal and Lans. See
Treaties, supra note 3, at 258. See also text accompanying note 167 infra.
7. The colonists felt compelled to reject the "constitutional practice" of the British
government in the conduct of its foreign affairs. See B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORI-
GiNs oF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTON (1967) [hereinafter cited as BAiLYN]; text accom-
panying note 185 infra.
8. A parallel theme is found in international law. In Case of the S.S. "Lotus," [1927]
P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 9, the court stated that, absent a written "constitution" with explicit
provisions prohibiting actions, such actions are permitted. Indeed, in Missouri v. Hol-
land, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), the Court found that "[tjhe treaty in question [did] not
contravene any prohibitory words to be found in the Constitution." Id. at 433. Thus,
McDougal and Lans state, as the extension of the argument, that the treaty-making
clause "[d]oes not exhaust the provisions of the Constitution ...which grant equally
broad powers .... " Treaties, supra note 3, at 217. See also AGREEMENTS, supra note
5, at 243.
The clearest expression of the divergence of views of the type of actions constitution-
ally permissible where there is no express provision governing it, can be seen in the fol-
lowing statements of two former Presidents:
- . [Theodore] Roosevelt said that it was not only the President's "right but his
duty to do anything that the needs of the Nation demanded unless such action was
forbidden by the Constitution or by the laws." Pursuant to that view he acts "for
the common well-being of all our people, whenever and in whatever manner ...
necessary, unless prevented by direct constitutional or legislative prohibition."
On the other side, William Howard Taft wrote: "The true view of the Executive
function is, as I conceive it, that the President can exercise no power which cannot
EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS
that the treaty-making procedure is to be the exclusive mode [by
which] the federal government can, under the Constitution, make in-
ternational agreements."'  This is because the "language is permissive
rather than mandatory." 10  It is therefore argued that because the
phrase "he shall have power" in the treaty-making clause11 differs from
the phrase "he shall," as used in the clause dealing with nominations
and appointments, 2 the treaty-making power grants discretion in de-
termining which procedure to use:' 3
The constitutional specification of a procedure whereby he may, or has
power to, make treaties, certainly leaves no room for inference that he
may not make other varieties of international acts, for that matter trea-
ties also, if there is an essential distinction, by other recognized pro-
cedures.14
Those other procedures are -the product of an unjustified "loose!' in-
terpretation of the Constitution, which derive their force from the lan-
guage of other clauses of the text. Yet, a full examination of sections
2 and 3 of article II discloses a difference between discretionary and
mandatory powers; 15 thus, the President "shall have power" to grant
be fairly and reasonably traced to some specific grant of power or justly implied
and included within such express grant as proper and necessary to its exercise....
There is no undefined residuum of power which he can exercise because it seems
to him to be in the public interest."
Quoted in G. GUNTnER & N. DOWLiNG, CONSTTUTIoNAL LAw, CASES AND MATERIALS
556 (8th ed. 1970).
9. Treaties, supra note 3, at 216.
10. Id.
11. "He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
Treaties, providing two thirds of the Senators present concur ... " U.S. CONST. art.
11, § 2.
12. "[H]e shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme
Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law ... ." U.S. CONST. art.
Ir, § 2.
13. In reference to article 11, section 2, dealing with the power and procedure of nomi-
nating ambassadors, McClure states that "in contradistinction to the permissive power
to make treaties, which immediately precedes it in the same clause . . . there appears
to be definite compulsion attached to this passage. In neither case, however, is ther
a stated negative." AGREEMENTS, supra note 5, at 243. See also Comment, Executive
Agreements and the Proposed Constitutional Amendments to the Treaty Power, 51
Micn. L. Ray. 1202, 1206 (1953). The treaty-making clause has never been interpreted
to be an exclusive mode, and it is considered a "permissive grant" in that it does not
preclude the making of agreements not considered treaties, but which are equally bind-
ing. 5 G. H'cKwoRTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 397 (1943).
14. AGREEMENTS, supra note 5, at 279.
15. Wright, The United States and International Agreements, 38 AM. J. INT'L L. 341,
342-43 n.5 (1944) [hereinafter cited as Wright]. See also Catudal, Executive Agree-
1975]
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reprieves and pardons, but he "shall" be Commander-in-Chief, receive
Ambassadors, and "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed
... 1 Where a discretionary power was conferred on the Presi-
dent, ,the phrase "he may" is used, as in section 2 requiring the opinions
of principal executive officers17 and in section 3 with the convening
and adjourning of Congress."" Nowhere do the proponents of an alter-
native method explain how the phrase "he shall have power" signifies
a permissive grant to use other procedures for making international
agreements. Rather, it seems apparent in light of the wording of other
clauses of the section that the President is to have discretion in de-
'termining when he would make use of the power, not that he had dis-
cretion in determining if another method was equally constitutionally
permissible.
Whether the language of the Constitution is permissive enough to
allow for executive agreements is a focal point of the issues that sur-
round 'the legal basis for such action. President Monroe, for one, had
difficulty in deciding just how permissive the Constitution is. Although
Monroe, as a delegate to the Virginia Ratifying Convention in 1788,
-thought the Senate might come -to "direct the affairs of the execu-
tive,"' 9 he felt it necessary to submit to the Senate the Rush-Bagot
agreement.20  His words are telling evidence of -the uncertainty that
surrounds the scope of executive prerogative:2'
ments: A Supplement to the Treaty Making Procedure, 10 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 653
(1942).
16. U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2-3.
17. "[HI]e may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of
the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective
Offices.. .... " U.S. CONsT. art. 11, § 2.
18. "[H]e may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them,
and in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment,
he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper . . ." U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 3. It should be noted, however, that this grant of permissive power is to take effect
only upon the happening of stated contingencies.
19. 3 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOP-
TION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOmmENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION
at PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 221-22 (2d ed. 1836).
20. Arrangement with Great Britain, Apr., 1817, 8 Stat. 231, T.S. No. 110/. The
agreement, entered into by the United States and Canada, dealt with limitations of naval
armaments on the Great Lakes. The Senate's approval and consent implies that it was
in the nature of a treaty. "However, most commentators have treated it as an executive
agreement, since ratifications were never exchanged." Treaties, supra note 3, at 247
n.138. See generally H.R. Doc. No. 471, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. (1900).
21. Apparently Theodore Roosevelt had less difficulty in understanding the signifi-
cance of constitutional language. Acting under a modus vendi, in establishing an agree-
ment with Santo Domingo, he said -that "[tihe Constitution did not explicity [sic] give
me power to bring about the necessary agreement with Santo Domingo. But the Consti-
[Vol. 8
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I submit it to the consideration of the Senate, whether this is such an
arrangement as the Executive is competent to enter into, by the powers
vested in it by the Constitution, or is such an [sic] one as requires -the
advice and consent of the Senate. 22
The problem with language is reflected in a more general problem
which pervades the entire issue of executive agreements. While even
the strongest advocates of executive agreements agree that there is a
difference between agreements and treaties,23 one cannot determine
"which are which."24 Often -the problem with definition has expanded
into two more specific, though interrelated, questions which serve as
a delineation: questions about subject matter and questions about
process. At one point, McDougal and Lans claim
there are no significant criterion [sic] under the Constitution of the
United States or in the diplomatic practice of this government, by which
the genus "treaty" can be distinguished from 'the genus "executive agree-
ment," other than the single criterion of the procedure or authority by
which the United States' consent to ratification is obtained.25
Four pages later, however, they state that "it is only . . . in terms of
the power by which they are authorized and validated that international
agreements can be distinguished under our Constitution."2 6  Clearly,
much more is involved here than mere differences in nomenclature or
phraseology. The political process which vests power in the different
branches of government is the basis by which a treaty can be dis-
tinguished from an executive agreement. And within the confines of
situational powers, as established by the Constitution, there is only one
procedure that is sanctioned by the Constitution. Because it is a ques-
tion of power,27 and how that power is to be exercised, one must turn
tution did not forbid my doing what I did." Quoted in Borchard, Shall the Executive
Agreement Replace the Treaty?, 53 YALE L.J. 664, 676 (1944) [hereinafter cited as
Borchard]. It might be remarked that Borchard's piece was the stimulus for MeDougal
and Lans.
22. Quoted in AGREEMENTS, supra note 5, at 31.
23. Sutherland states that a precise dividing line has never been determined, but sug-
gests a possible distinction in terms of the significance of subject matter and scope. G.
SUTHERLAND, CONSTrUTONAL PowR AND WORLD AFFAIRS 119-20 (1919).
24. L. HENKIN, FOREiGN AFFAmS ANrim CoNsTrUTON 179 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as HENImN] (speaking on the extent to which the treaty is interchangeable with
the executive agreement).
25. Treaties, supra note 3, at 199 (emphasis added). In relation to the diplomatic
practice of the United States and the role of ambassadors and envoys in making execu-
tive agreements, see text accompanying note 194 infra.
26. Treaties, supra note 3, at 203 (emphasis added and footnote omitted).
27. Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L. Rlv. 1, 51
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Presidential Monopoly]. McDougal and Lans seem to rec-
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to the Constitution to learn the proper limits assigned the Senate and
the President within the political process. 8
While the Constitution is without direction regarding the subject
matter of international acts that fall under the treaty-making clause, it
is thought that the treaty-making process is to be invoked only when
the agreement is of major or significant importance to the country.20
Presumably, treaties take on a "special significance" in that they alone
are mentioned by the Constitution, and as such they possess a "special
constitutional protection. ' 30  However, this distinction affords us little
in that congressionally authorized agreements have achieved the status
of a treaty," and it is now assumed that executive agreements have
the status of a treaty as supreme law of the land.32  It is all too ap-
parent, then, that the basis upon which either mode will be used is de-
termined by the subject matter,33 but it is the President who has be-
ognize that "politicaljudgment" is the decisive factor in determining the difference be-
tween agreements and treaties. Treaties, supra note 3, at 231.
28. See Mathews, The Constitutional Power of the President to Conclude Interna-
tional Agreements, 64 YALE L. 345 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Mathews]. Mathews,
a strong proponent of executive agreements, offers a counterbalancing view of what is
at stake: "It is as futile to attempt to extract logical consistency from the literal pro-
visions of the Constitution as it is dangerous to over-emphasize the powers of one
branch of the government at the expense of another." Id. at 347-48. He ultimately
falls back on a claim of usage and practice, as do McDougal and Lans. See note 221
infra.
29. Even Senator Case was willing to recognize this distinction:
The Constitution does not define the term "treaty." Yet, it seems clear that the
Founding Fathers intended any agreement with a foreign country on a matter of
substance to be embraced within the term. Certainly they did not intend that the
President must get Senate approval of perfunctory routine minor agreements ....
Hearings on S. R. 214 Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. 3 (1972) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. See also 66 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 840 (1972); Borchard, supra note 21, at 669 n.20.
30. Borchard, Treaties and Executive Agreements-A Reply, 54 YALE L.J. 616, 628
(1945) [hereinafter cited as Borchard, Treaties].
31. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583, 600-01 (1912).
32. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S.
324 (1937).
33. Corwin hints at this practice:
mhe record of constitutional practice makes it clear that any agreement with a
foreign government in the making of which the advice and consent of the Senate
is sought is, for that reason if no other, a "treaty" in the sense of Article H, section
2, paragraph 2. The sole importance which the distinction in question retains today
arises from the support which it lends to the position that there are types of interna-
tional agreements into which the United States cannot constitutionally enter except
by the treaty-making route ....
E. CoRxwN, ThE CONSrrUTON AND WORLD ORGANIZATION 32 (1944) [hereinafter cited
as WORLD ORGANIZATION].
Henkin shows the precariousness of any distinction grounded on subject matter: "One
might suggest that the President must go to the Senate with 'important' agreements, but
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come the sole judge of what is or is not of requisite significance to re-
quire Senate participation.
It is generally agreed that the Founders were aware of a difference
between an agreement and a treaty. 4 Constant reference is made to
article I, section 10 of the Constitution which provides that "No State
shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance or Confederation: ... [and] No
State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, . . .enter into any
Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power."35
What advocates of international agreements, made under the Presi-
dent's power, fail to recognize is that this distinction mitigates any claim
that the President has exclusive power to exercise his prerogatives in
making executive agreements. In addition, such a distinction allows
us to discern the scope given to the term "treaty" by the Framers. In
Federalist 75, Hamilton stated that treaties are "agreements between
sovereign and sovereign." ' Elsewhere, Hamilton extended the defini-
tion to be a broad mandate "[tlo give to that power the most ample
latitude-to render it competent .to all the stipulations which the
exigencies of national affairs might require. . .. ,,"7 The lines of dif-
ference were probably drawn on the basis of Vattel's Le Droit des
Gens, 8 which defines "agreements" as embracing "continuous execu-
tory obligations of future duration," including permanent, long-stand-
ing agreements, and "compacts" as "those agreements of temporary,
non-continuous, single acts." 9 While a more extensive reading of the
"compact clause" has been advanced,40 a strict reading of the Constitu-
even that 'definition' would have at least one major qualification: executive agreements
have been used for some very important agreements where either or both parties desired
that the agreement remain confidential." HENKIN, supra note 24, at 181-82. "'In some
instances we have come close to reversing the traditional distinction between the treaty
as the instrument of a major commitment and the executive agreement as the instrument
of a minor one."' Id. at 430 n.31, quoting SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONs, NA-
TiONAL CoMMITMENTs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1969). See generally Sayre, The Con-
stitutionality of the Trade Agreements Act, 39 CoLuM. L. REv. 751, 755 (1939).
34. Borchard, supra note 21, at 667-68; Weinfeld, What Did the Framers of the Fed-
eral Constitution Mean by "Agreements or Compacts"?, 3 U. Cm. L. Rav. 453 (1936).
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; see Borchard, Treaties, supra note 30, at 627-28; Presi-
dential Monopoly, supra note 27, at 42; Treaties, supra note 3, at 221.
36. THE FEDERAuST No. 75, at 486 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937) (A. Hamilton) [herein-
after cited as TrE FEDER.AUST].
37. Letters of Camillus, in 6 A. HAMiLTON, THE WoRKs OF ALExANDER HAMILTON
183 (H. Lodge ed. 1904) [hereinafter cited as WoRKs].
38. E. VATTEL, LE DRorr DES GENs OU PINCIPES DE LA Loi NATURELLE (1916).
39. Id. §§ 152-54, 160. See also Borchard, supra note 21, at 668-70; Wright, supra
note 15, at 344 n.11.
40. See Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study in
Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE LJ. 685, 695 (1925).
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tion, as well as a clear understanding of the intent of the Framers, pre-
cludes any thought that the term treaty was meant to be limited in
scope and subject matter to such extent that it was permissible in allow-
ing an alternative method for binding the United States by international
agreements.
41
The concern here over definition should not be dismissed as mere
academic verbiage. Chief Justice Taney once remarked that "every
word must have its due force . . . . No word in the [Constitution]
can be rejected as superfluous or unmeaning . *.. "4 Yet, the writ-
ers of a more permissive interpretation have taken the privilege of de-
fining the subject matter of agreements and carried it to a point of such
expanded presidential power that the words of the Constitution are de-
fined away. McClure, for example, understood -the words of Chief
Justice Taney to mean that "since the Constitution sets forth no direc-
tions regarding -the use or content of either [agreements or treaties],
it would seem to leave clear the path for their alternative use at the
discretion of the national government. ' 43  Far from it: Chief Justice
41. It is generally assumed by most nations that when a representative having status
of ambassador or special envoy gives guarantees as to the validity of his action, the re-
ciprocal nations can rely on such assurances and consider the agreement binding. While
the foreign country need not concern itself with the "internal" processes of the agreeing
nation in order for the agreement to be binding, this can result in the President conceiv-
ably engaging the country in long-range obligations from which the United States could
not, internationally, extricate itself. Although the subject matter of the agreement is
seemingly definitive on the question of the method to be used, it must be recognized
that there is overlapping authority governing spheres of operation within the govern-
ment. The President and the Senate can make agreements on any matter which is prop-
erly the subject of negotiation with a foreign country. Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258,
266 (1890). Congress can authorize agreements on subject matter within the scope of
its legislative powers. Cf. text accompanying note 148 infra. Such overlapping pre-
sumably grants the President discretion as to the method to be used. However, domesti-
cally, the definitional limitations of the subject matter vitiates claims by the executive
allowing a circumvention of the treaty-making process except for minor, routine matters,
while internationally, it is the responsibility of the agreeing nation to be aware of the
internal laws validating any agreement:
To know the powers of him with whom negotiations are conducted requires a
'knowledge not only of his special mandate and powers, the exhibition of which may
always be demanded before the opening of negotiations, but also of the funda-
mental law, or constitution of the state which he professes to represent.
S. CPANDALL, TEATIES, THEIR MAKING D ENFORCEMENT 2-3 (2d ed. 1916) [herein-
after cited as CRmDALL]. Clearly, practice has dictated otherwise.
42. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 570-71 (1840).
43. AGREEmENTs, supra note 5, at 277. McClure totally overlooks the import of his
own statement. If the discretion is to be left to the "national government," who is to
decide that the President alone shall determine the method to be used? See text accom-
panying notes 106 & 113 infra. The purpose of a written constitution would seemingly
be to alleviate this very problem.
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Taney's words in no way reflect this open-ended interpretation of the
Constitution.
44
If the executive branch and the surrogates of executive agreements
are allowed free reign to establish the scope, meaning, and definition
of the terms of the compact, -there is little that the Senate or the courts
can do in response.45 However, because such vast importance was at-
tached to treaties, both in scope and subject matter, the Founders in-
corporated Senate participation in the treaty-making process. Pre-
cisely because the actions of the United States are crucial to world af-
fairs and because executive agreements of any type have a direct bear-
ing on the national conduct in international relations,4" one must ex-
amine the reason why the Framers divided the power of treaty-making,
a power to be shared jointly by the Senate and the President, in order to
"afford a greater prospect of security, than the separate possession of
it by either of them. 47
H
Leading advocates of expanding presidential power, such as Mc-
Dougal and Lans, concede that the presidential agreement is limited
in scope.4 8 But the same authors characterize the treaty-making proc-
ess as a needless encumbrance, "a sort of constitutional vermiform ap-
pendix. 40  This last statement is suggestive in its approach to a politi-
cal problem: while the executive agreement is not always a viable
alternative to the treaty, we can blur whatever distinctions might exist,
and in so doing, the political process in which the Senate is a partici-
pant, becomes itself the very reason for transforming the process into
one in which the President exercises full power. Whatever political
problems arise because of the treaty-making clause, we can simply skirt
the issues by ignoring the treaty-making process. The "vermiform ap-
pendix" is thus surgically removed with the scalpel of "loose construc-
44. See MiLLER, supra note 2, at 165.
45. Senator Fulbright adequately expressed the sentiment: "There is nothing really
we can do about it if the executive branch insists upon that term [executive agreement].
Nothing directly. We can only approach it indirectly, obliquely and in a very unsatis-
factory way." Hearings, supra note 29, at 6.
46. For a reference to the views of Senator Harry Byrd, suggesting that any agreement
deals with United States foreign policy and hence effects the nation as a whole, see id.
at 5.
47. Thm FEDRmusT No. 75, supra note 36, at 488 (A. Hamilton).
48. Treaties, supra note 3, at 187, 225, 311, 317.
49. Id. at 535.
1975)
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tionism" and is replaced instead with a deformity in the Constitution
that seriously jeopardizes the working of the organ.
The basic theory of separation of powers helps explain why the
power of treaty-making was distributed between the President and the
Senate. The primary function of the Constitution is to establish the
boundaries of governmental power.50 Indeed, the colonists had been
compelled to put into a written form the limits of power to be exer-
cised by each branch of government. 51 They had been witness to what
was, in their minds, a definite manipulation of Parliament by a corrupt
and power-hungry monarchy and ministry. 52  It was the belief of the
Framers that the matters concerning foreign affairs were so vitally im-
portant that the need for restraint, as well as senatorial input, was es-
sential. 53  From the very beginning, the Congress was meant to have
full power over the foreign affairs of the country,54 and it was only after
they understood the need for a single representative that the President
was included in the making of treaties. 55 The constitutional language
of the treaty-making clause suggests that both the President and the
Senate, "throughout the entire process of treaty-making,"0 were to
share in the procedure. Indeed, the Constitutional Convention had
"done well. . . in so disposing of the power of making treaties ....
[Tihe President must, in forming them, act by the advice and consent
of the Senate. .... ,,-
50. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 36 (J. Madison).
51. Id. See also BAILYN, supra note 7, at 182-83.
52. BAILYN, supra note 7, at 170-71 (especially chapter 5). A quick glance at the
Declaration of Independence confirms the idea that the colonists felt themselves to be
in the midst of a "conspiracy" at the hands of the British ministry:
[A] long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Ob-
ject envinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism. . . . The history
of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpa-
tions, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over
these States.
There is then set forth a series of "Facts" to support these contentions,
53. Presidential Monopoly, supra note 27, at 7-12, 55-58. See also THE FEDERALIST
No. 75, supra note 36 (A. Hamilton).
54. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. VI, IX; CRANDALL, supra note 41, at 27.
55. Presidential Monopoly, supra note 27, at 10-11. See also J. SANDERS, EVOLUTION
OF ExEcurrvE DEPARTmNTS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 124-27
(1935) [hereinafter cited as SANDERS].
56. E. CORwIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 207 (1957)[hereinafter cited
as CoRwiN]. He further cites the first Oustanding Committee on Foreign Relations:
The President is the constitutional representative of the United States with regard
to foreign nations. . . . For his conduct he is responsible to the Constitution. The
committee considers this responsibility the surest pledge for the faithful discharge
of his duty.
Id. at 441 n.1 4 . Why can we not also assume that the Senate will faithfully discharge
its constitutional duties without sacrificing the national interest?
57. THE FEDERALIST No. 64, supra note 36, at 419 (J. Jay).
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In Federalist 64, John Jay stated -that
.the power of making treaties is an important one. . . and it should not
be delegated but in such a mode and with such precautions, as will af-
ford the highest security that it will be exercised by men the best quali-
fied for the purpose, and in a manner most conducive to the public
good.
58
Hamilton, a warm advocate for limited monarchy, 9 who had thought
that the powers in the Constitution ought to be construed liberally, for
the public good,60 never lost sight of the inherent dangers of investing
in the President full power over the making of treaties."i
While the Framers sought to place upon the exercise of power all
conceivable, yet practical, checks, advocates of executive agreements
recognize that the President, in negotiating and consummating treaties
alone, is violating the constitutional text, and "[in this respect the ex-
pectations of the Framers have not been realized, and the procedures
prescribed in the Constitution have been drastically altered .. 2. ."
Perhaps this has resulted because that which was conceivable by our
Founding Fathers in the eighteenth century is far from what is politically
practical in the twentieth century. 63 But such a view of the treaty-mak-
ing process attempts, on the very basis of that same process, to explain
away any function and political benefit of the Senate's participation.
64
Writing in the Federalist, Hamilton calls attention to the difference
between the King of England and the President with respect to making
treaties:
58. Id. at 417.
59. The Farmer Refuted, in 1 Wolucs, supra note 37, at 168.
60. 3 WoRKs, supra note 37, at 455.
61. Hamilton states:
Mhe vast importance of the trust, and the operation of treaties as laws, plead strong-
ly for the participation of the whole or a portion of the legislative body in the office
of making them.
mr he joint possession of the power in question, by the President and Sen-
ate, would afford a greater prospect of security, than the separate possession of
it by either of them.
THE FEDERALIST No. 75, supra note 36, at 486, 488. See also Presidential Monopoly,
supra note 27, at 11.
62. Treaties, supra note 3, at 206. The attitude of McDougal and Lans is the para-
digm cavalier approach to the efficacy of the Constitution: What has worked by way of
"diplomatic practice," and the treatment of agreements in foreign affairs, justifies aberra-
tions of the text. Cf. id. at 307.
63. McDougal and Lans argue against the political practicality of having Senate par-
ticipation. Id. at 536-82. But their notion of cooperation boils down to a stringent de-
mand for mere agreement with the President.
64. McDougal and Lans do see a political advantage to the inclusion of Senate par-
ticipation in that the President has used the modification power of the Senate "to attempt
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The king of Great Britain is the sole and absolute representative of the
nation in all foreign transactions.6 5  He can of his own accord make
treaties of peace, commerce, alliance, and of every other description.
It has been insinuated, that his authority in this respect is not conclusive,
and that his conventions with foreign powers are subject to the re-
vision, and stand in need of the ratification, of Parliament. But...
every jurist of that kingdom, and every other man acquainted with its
Constitution, knows, as an established fact, that the prerogative of mak-
ing treaties exists in the crown in its utmost plentitude; and that the
compacts entered into by the royal authority have the most complete
legal validity and perfection, independent of any other sanction ....
In this respect. . there is no comparison between the intended power
of the President and the actual power of the British sovereign. The one
can perform alone what the other can do only with the concurrence of
a branch of the legislature. 66
The incorporation of the Senate in the making of treaties was estab-
lished because it was the firm hope of the Framers to bring to bear
upon the decision-making process a wider range of knowledge, incul-
cating any decision with the force of public backing. Advocates of
executive agreements, in arguing for their constitutional basis, have
completely overlooked the function of the Senate as an advisory body.07
McClure considers the Senate incapable of meaningful participation in
any agreements but those of an insignificant nature. 8  But the Senate's
real power in the treaty-making process lies in its ability to set forth
an adequate forum for public debate.69
It might, then, be argued -that if public debate is the controlling or
dominant factor for including the Senate, a more logical participant
to obtain concessions not secured by the original negotiators or to include provisions sug-
gested by the other signatory after negotiation." Id. at 208-09 n.61.
65. For a further discussion of the significance of the President as the "sole repre-
sentative," see text accompanying note 113 infra.
66. Tm FEDERALIST No. 69, supra note 36, at 450-51 (A. Hamilton). See also
AGREmENTs, supra note 5, at 259; Presidential Monopoly, supra note 27, at 9. While
it might be argued that the minister, and not the King, was responsible for foreign af-
fairs, this is no less a reason to be concerned. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
Furthermore, even though the Framers might have had an overextended conception of
their Senators, it is a safe assumption to view the Senate as exercising more power than
the Parliament in regard to foreign affairs. See THE FEDERALisT No. 64, supra note
36 (in which Jay seemingly refers to the Senate as a body of "august men").
67. McDougal and Lans describe the process of senatorial participation but "neglect"
to include the advisory function. Treaties, supra note 3, at 197-99.
68. AGREEMNTS, supra note 5, at 363.
69. ""The Senate's real power in treaty making is not merely a mechanical one; it
resides in the Senate's ability to force public debate, awake doubts and secure popular
support for other courses than those proposed by the Executive.'" Borchard, supra note
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would be the House of Representatives. 70  But the House was ex-
cluded by the Constitutional Convention on grounds of secrecy and
speed. As James Iredell, then a delegate to the North Carolina Rati-
fying Convention, and later a Supreme Court Justice, pointed out:
The power of making treaties is so important that it would have been
highly dangerous to invest it in the Executive alone, and would have
been subject of much greater clamor. From the nature of the thing,
it could not have been vested in the popular representative. It must,
therefore, have been provided, for with the Senate's concurrence or
the concurrence of a Privy council, (a thing which I believe nobody has
been mad enough to propose), or the power, the greatest monarchial
power that can be exercised, must have been vested in a manner that
would have excited universal indignation, in the President alone.71
A further justification for excluding the Senate usually stems from
the Senate's ability to block the consummation of a treaty. Claims for
efficiency, no less than demands for a more "democratic" method, are
often heard in connection with the advocacy of executive agreements.
Proponents of expanded presidential power claim that "[tihe execu-
tive, set up for action, is usually a better agency for negotiation than
is a body set up primarily for deliberation; it is through negotiation,
not primarily deliberation, that international affairs are conducted."7
It takes no imagination to see that this argument is self-defeating. Not
only is it a statement about what is wrong with the present state of
world affairs, but it also totally neglects the very reason for the Senate's
role. There is no doubting that the President must start the negotia-
21, at 667 n.12, quoting N.Y. Herald Tribune, Apr. 17, 1944, at 14, col. 1. See also I.
MATHEWS, AsmnmcAN FOREIGN RELATIONS: CoNDucr AND PoLicrEs 545-46 (1938) (sug-
gesting that agreements, like treaties, should be subject to the "salutary influence of pub-
lic opinion," and that "the country should not ... be bound by the stipulations of ex-
ecutive agreements without its knowledge and without opportunity to protest"). In light
of the fact that the President might indeed be far removed from the reality of the po-
litical process, it would be wise to incorporate another voice into the decision-making
process. Cf. G. REEDY, THE TWIIGHT OF THE PRESIDENCY passim (1970). We need
not accept Jay's characterization (see note 66 supra) in order to believe the Senate cap-
able of providing beneficial, rational input into the process. See Presidential Monopoly,
supra note 27, at 55-58; note 53 supra.
70. This is the thesis of McDougal and Lans. However, because they often inter-
change the terms "Congressional-Executive" agreements with "Executive" or "Presiden-
tial" agreements, usually in the same phrase, one is hard-pressed to comprehend the re-
spective constitutional significance given to each. See Treaties, supra note 3, at 194,
195, 216, 217, 226, passim.
71. Quoted in Hearings on S. 3475 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Separation of
Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings on S. 3475]. See generally the statement by Senator Ervin, id. at 1-7.
72. AGREE-mNTS, supra note 5, at 257.
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tions, but "otherwise all negotiations of treaties will be the joint concern
of President and Senate. '7 3  McDougal and Lans go further, however,
and attack the two-third rule of Senate consent. Suggesting that the
President must be able to act without delays, "obstructions, and dis-
integrating efforts by minorities," McDougal and Lans strike out
against the two-third rule of Senate consent, finding the role of the
Senate to be one in which those "who conceive their interests to be
different from the interests of the rest of the nation 174 will adequately
and effectively block the majority will. One can certainly question this
assessment of the President's ability to be an accurate gauge of the
majority interests. More importantly, the issues contained in any deci-
sion relating to the making of treaties dictate that more than one voice
should be heard. At the heart of their contention is the notion that
the House should be favored over the Senate for participation because
a majority concurrence in the House is easier to obtain than two-thirds
of the Senate. While there are several reasons why the Framers wrote
into the treaty-making process the two-third rule,75 it should be men-
tioned that arguments against the two-third rule are misdirected when
they are used to claim for the House greater expediency in the resolu-
tion of issues. Secrecy would be as much a problem, if not more so,
for the House than the Senate. But the Framers were well aware of
both these problems, and in Federalist 64, Jay explains that the Senate
would be most capable of providing public discussion while guarantee-
ing expediency and secrecy.7 6 Justice Brandeis put into bold relief the
central issues involved:
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention
of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbi-
trary power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by means
of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental
powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy.77
73. CoRwna, supra note 56, at 208.
74. Treaties, supra note 3, at 185-86.
75. Most often stated is that the two-third rule is a carry-over from the Continental
Congress' practice of requiring two-thirds of the states to ratify a treaty. Also, the rule
was seen as a compromise between the large and small states, as well as a parlay of
sectional interests that were meant to be protected by this compromise. McClure claims
that none of the reasons for the rule are "in any realistic sense pertinent to the situation
that exists in the twentielh century." AGREEMENTS, supra note 5, at 265. Yet, the
clearest response, for all ages and time, was given by Borchard: "A treaty should be
convincing enough to command a two-third vote." Borchard, supra note 21, at 667.
76. ThE FFDERALIST No. 64, supra note 36, at 419-20 (J. Jay). It should be noted
that, when Jay spoke of the Senate, he contemplated a body of twenty-six people.
77. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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If other clauses of the Constitution are subject to a more "general"
interpretation, there can be no doubt that the treaty-making clause is
of a "specific' nature and admits of neither expansion through judicial
interpretation; nor does it grant a "permissive" exercise of power that
would circumvent its very intention.7 8 Yet, proponents of executive
agreements have frequently pointed to certain Supreme Court decisions
as affording ample grounds for expanded presidential power.79 How-
ever, a closer examination of those decisions will show that "the firm
judicial support that has been accorded ' 80 is not only a distortion of
constitutional history, but also greatly misrepresents the text itself.
That the Constitution vests in the national government power over
foreign affairs is undoubted. "As a nation with all the attributes of
sovereignty, the United States is vested with all the powers of govern-
ment necessary to maintain an effective control of international rela-
tions."81  While a demarcation was established between powers over
domestic affairs and those pertaining to foreign affairs, 2 it has been
assumed that the powers of the federal government, in the latter re-
spect, are inherent:8 3
It is no longer open to question that the general government, unlike the
states, possesses no inherent power in respect of the internal affairs of
the states; and emphatically not with regard to legislation. The ques-
tion in respect of the inherent power of that government as to the ex-
ternal affairs of the nation and in the field of international law is a
wholly different matter .... 84
78. For an explanation on the difference between a "general" clause of the Consti-
tution, as opposed to those of a more "specific" nature, see MILRa, supra note 2, at 162-
65, citing United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 321 (1946) (Frankfurter, I., concur-
ring); see text accompanying note 232 infra.
79. Most often cited is United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v.
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S.
304 (1936); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). Usually, however, the discus-
sion of these cases is cast in language of the powers of the "federal government" and
not the President alone.
80. AGPEEmENTS, supra note 5, at 283.
81. Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U.S. 378, 396 (1933), cited in United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936). See also CoRWIN, supra note 56, at
170-226.
82. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315 (1936).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936);
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Chinese Exclusion Case, 130
U.S. 581 (1889).
84. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 295 (1936) (citations omitted). See also
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 275 (1918), overruled in United States v. Darby
Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890).
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The basis for this comprehensive national power has led to certain
disputes which are of fundamental concern to both the scope of power
to be exercised, as well as the power that is assigned to the various
branches of government. The origin of this debate can be traced to
the opinions of Justices Iredell and Patterson in the case of Penhallow
v. Doane,85 in which they found themselves in disagreement as to
whether the power over foreign affairs originated in the several states,
passing to the national government with ratification of the Constitution,
or whether the national government, in the form of the Continental
Congress, had the original power. The theory that the national gov-
ernment, and not the states, was the original possessor of authority to
deal with foreign relations reached its most advanced exposition in the
opinion of Justice Sutherland in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corporation.86
Although Curtiss-Wright dealt exclusively with the question of the
legality of a congressional delegation of power,87 Justice Sutherland
used the opinion as a platform for wide-ranging dicta that has served
as the basis for claims by the executive branch justifying executive
agreements.8 To quote in part from the Sutherland opinion:
As a result of the separation from Great Britain by the colonies acting
as a unit, the powers of external sovereignty passed from the Crown not
to the colonies severally, but to the colonies in their collective and cor-
porate capacity as the United States of America. Even before the
Declaration, -the colonies were a unit in foreign affairs, acting through
a common agency-namely the Continental Congress. . . . It results
that the investment of the federal government with the powers of ex-
ternal sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the
Constitution. The powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace,
85. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54 (1795).
86. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). The case concerned a Joint Resolution of Congress which
provided, in part:
[hlf the President finds that the prohibition of the sale of arms and munitions of
war in the United States to those countries now engaged in armed conflict in the
Chaco may contribute to the reestablishment of peace between those countries, and
if. . . he makes proclamation to that effect, it shall be unlawful to sell, except un-
der such limitations and exceptions as the President prescribes, any arms or muni-
tions of war ....
Cong. J. Res., ch. 365, 48 Stat. 811 (1934). The President issued a proclamation, and
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. was indicted for conspiracy to sell arms in violation there-
of. It contended that the resolution contained an unwarranted and unconstitutional dele-
gation of legislative power to the President. 299 U.S. at 314-15. The district court sus-
tained the demurrer, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding the actions of the Presi-
dent to be within constitutionally prescribed limits.
87. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
88. Cf. Hearings, supra note 29; Hearings on S. 3475, supra note 71, passim.
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to make treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereign-
ties, if they had never been mentioned in the Constitution, would have
vested in the federal government as necessary concomitants of nation-
ality.89
Followers of the Sutherland reading have gone to great lengths to
justify his interpretation of constitutional history. But they have failed
to recognize the overriding fallacies which argue against any claim
made in behalf of the exercise of these powers. Justice Sutherland
was not oblivious to the fact that the states, as members of the Conti-
nental Congress, adopted the Declaration of Independence.9" But a
reading of that document convincingly demonstrates that the "United
Colonies" were free and independent states.91  In addition, the Ar-
ticles of Confederation stipulated that: "Each State retains its sover-
eignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction and
right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the
United States in Congress assembled."
92
In what is perhaps his most eloquent effort of the Federalist, Hamil-
ton argues against the "political monster of an imperium in imperio,"93
and the resulting defects of a government in which "the concurrence
of thirteen distinct sovereign wills is requisite under the Confederation,
to the complete execution of every important measure that proceeds
from the Union.""
A further aspect of Justice Sutherland's opinion deserves some men-
tion. In stating that the "powers of external sovereignty did not de-
pend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution,"'9 Justice Suther-
land reflects that school of constitutional interpretation which sees in the
Constitution grants of power not expressly prohibited therein. 96 It is
supposedly because the enumerated powers are limiting that the govern-
89. 299 U.S. at 316, 318.
90. Id. at 316.
91. Mhese United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent
States ... and that, as Free and Independent States, they have full Power to levy
War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other
Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do.
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. The fact that the Declaration was written eleven years
before the Constitution is of no mean significance.
92. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. II. This language later served as the basis for
the tenth amendment to the Constitution.
93. "A sovereign within a sovereign." THE FEDERALIST No. 15, supra note 36, at 89
(A. Hamilton).
94. Id. at 94.
95. 299 U.S. at 318.
96. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
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ment can turn to its inherent powers for an "affirmance of power." '
However, it is not "silence on the part of the Constitution as to the
power of the national government" 98 that was meant to dictate the
scope in which the President could exercise his powers. Rather, it was
the "intention of the Framers to create a federal government of limited
and enumerated powers." '  We are told, however, that a different
reading and understanding of the Constitution is justified because of
the position of the United States in world affairs. 100 We learn that "the
requirements of survival as a democratic body politic in the contem-
porary arena," are far different from the demands of 1787.101 But
then the very support given to this position is derived from the opinion
of Justice Patterson in Penhallow v. Doane,102 a scant eight years after
the Constitution was written: "The powers of Congress were revolu-
tionary in their nature, arising out of events, adequate to every na-
tional emergency, and co-extensive with the object to be attained." 03
True enough, if one considers that centralization is the key to an
effective conduct of the war. 0 4  However much this remains the
case, we are never told how the powers vested in Congress to conduct
a war were meant to be continued once the "necessities of the case"'0 8
no longer presented themselves.
97. Corwin suggests that "silence on the part of the Constitution as to the power of
the national government to adopt any particular measure . . . is not a denial of such
power, as it would be if the doctrine of Enumerated powers applied, but is, on the con-
trary, an affirmance of power." WORLD ORGANIZAiTON, supra note 33, at 19. Mc-
Dougal and Lans argue that even if the enumerated powers are not enough to grant the
exercise of power to make executive agreements, the inherent powers are. Treaties, su-
pra note 3, at 256-57.
98. WORLD ORGANIZATON, supra note 33, at 19.
99. Presidential Monopoly, supra note 27, at 27.
100. Cf. Mathews, supra note 28, at 345.
101. Id. A similar line of reasoning was set forth by McDougal and Lans, Treaties,
supra note 3, at 185. Hamilton certainly recognized the logical extension of this power:
"It is of the nature of war to increase the executive at the expense of the legislative
authority." THE FFDERALiST No. 8, supra note 36, at 43.
102. 3 U.S. (3 Dal].) 54 (1795). Justice Chase rephrased Patterson's statement to
read: "The powers of Congress originated from necessity . . .they were revolutionary
in their very nature .... It was absolutely and indispensably necessary that Congress
should possess the power of conducting the war against Great Britain .... " Ware v.
Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 232 (1796).
103. 3 U.S. (3 Dal.) 54, 80 (1795).
104. See Presidential Monopoly, supra note 27, at 31.
105. McDougal and Lans state that
[w]hatever the rationale used, it is perfectly clear that in the conduct of our inter-
national relations, the powers of the Federal Government are ample to deal with
any problem, because they derive not only from the Constitution, "but from the
necessities of the case."
Treaties, supra note 3, at 260; see Mathews, supra note 28, at 348. See also CORwIN,
supra note 56, at 201.
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What Justice Sutherland confused for exclusive jurisdiction of the
government in foreign relations was an absolute and unlimited jurisdic-
tion that never existed. Successive repetition of his mistake has not
rendered the misinterpretation any nearer to the facts of constitutional
history. In words that are more than appropriate, Chief Justice Taney
remarked:
Every part of... [the Constitution] shows that our whole foreign
intercourse was intended to be committed to the hands of the general
government: and nothing shows it more strongly than the treaty-mak-
ing power, and the power of appointing and receiving ambassadors;
both of which . ..undoubtedly belong exclusively to the federal gov-
ernment. 100
What is significant is that Justice Taney recognized the powers of the
national government to be limited, and they are limited precisely be-
cause they are enumerated in the Constitution.
10 7
Even if the idea of inherent powers could be given a more favorable
reading, it would be difficult to accept a far greater mistake on the part
of Justice Sutherland and his successors. The philosophy of separation
of powers dictates that we refrain from transferring power in the na-
tional government to any one branch. However, most of the constitu-
tional arguments favoring executive agreements stem from this very
transference. It is often said that "in the field of foreign affairs...
the doctrine of enumerated powers has always had a difficult row to
hoe, and today may be unqualifiedly asserted to be defunct."' 08  For-
tunately, the Constitution has been revived by a simple superimposition
of the enumerated powers upon the inherent powers, resulting in con-
stitutionally justifiable power of the President to make executive agree-
ments.'0 9 Indeed, it is even argued that the powers of the President
106. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 575 (1840) (emphasis added). Jus-
tice Taney continued:
It was one of the main objects of the Constitution to make us, so far as regarded
our foreign relations, one people, and one nation; and to cut off all communications
between foreign governments, and the several state authorities. The power now
claimed for the states, is utterly incompatible with this evident intention; and would
expose us to one of those dangers, against which the framers ... have so anxiously
endeavoured to guard.
Id. at 575-76. It is worth noting, however, that the case before him dealt with the defi-
nitional scope of the word "agreement" as contained in article I, section 10, clause 3.
See WORLD ORGANIZATION, supra note 33, at 9-10.
On the question of the President speaking as the voice of the country, see text accom-
panying note 117 infra.
107. For a more detailed examination of the questions surrounding inherent powers,
see Presidential Monopoly, supra note 27, at 26-33.
108. WORLD ORGANIZATION, supra note 33, at 17.
109. McDougal and Lans throughout their work suggest that the powers of Congress
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are in some aspects inoperative and ineffective without such a super-
imposition."1 Once again one finds Justice Sutherland as the chief
advocate of such a view:
It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone with
an authority vested in the President by an exertion of legislative power,
but with such an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive
power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in
the field of international relations-a power which does not require as
a basis for its exercise an act of Congress .... 'll
Yet, he continues, qualifying his assertion in the same sentence: "but
which, of course, like every other governmental power, must be exer-
cised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitu-
tion.""' 2 Now clearly, one of the most "applicable" provisions of the
Constitution is article I, section 8, empowering Congress "[t]o make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execu-
tion the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Consti-
tution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department
or Officer thereof." The effect of this provision, in terms of Justice
Sutherland's own assertion, is to remove the constitutional effectiveness
of the President's power when Congress should choose to exercise its
own constitutional prerogatives.
Justice Sutherland is wrong on still other grounds. For what he has
done is to deposit in the hands of the executive branch the full powers
"superadded" to the powers of the President make "plenary" power. Treaties, supra note
3, at 246. Least of all, does this rest on a false assumption about the nature of inherent
powers. More importantly, it seems to indicate that the authors view the Constitution
as interpretable as some alchemist's formula for political power. In passing, it should
be noted that it is questionable whether congressional powers are of the type that would
allow for an expansion of presidential powers, ultimately resulting in power to make ex-
ecutive agreements. That is, Congress can not deal with foreign nations directly, and
thus could delegate no such power to the President. See text accompanying note 131
infra.
110. McDougal and Lans characterize the attempts of those who seek to confine the
President's power to making unimportant, temporary agreements:
Their first effort is to secure a focus of attention solely upon the single, explicitly
discretionary, and ambiguous "treaty-making" clause of the Constitution to the ex-
clusion of all other relevant clauses of the Constitution granting powers to the Con-
gress and the President, which are meaningful only if they include the authorizing
or sanctioning of international agreements.
Treaties, supra note 3, at 211-12. Elsewhere, they claim that the broad powers given
by the Constitution to the President and Congress over external affairs are meaningless
without instrumental powers to make agreements and to have them as the law of the
land. Id. at 187.
111. 299 U.S. at 319-20.
112. Id. at 320. For a discussion about the President's power as the "sole organ of
the federal government," see text accompanying note 113 infra.
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of the national government. Thus, he tells us that the federal power
over external affairs is "different from that over internal affairs," in that
participation in the exercise of power is significantly limited. In this
vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and mani-
fold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a
representative of the nation .... As Marshall said in his great argu-
ment of March 7, 1800, in the House of Representatives, "the President
is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole
representative with foreign nations."" 3
The same line of reasoning was followed in United States v. Belmont'
14
and United States v. Pink. g5  But, as Raoul Berger demonstrates," 6
Marshall was speaking on the matter of extradition under terms of a
treaty with Great Britain. The question was one simply of the Presi-
dent's function to execute the law. In no way was the question of Sen-
ate participation in the making of a treaty involved, nor was there doubt
as to which branch of government there devolved certain powers under
the Constitution.
What can be distilled from the Sutherland opinion, and which is con-
sistent with the intent of the Framers, is that the executive is to function
as an "instrument of communications with other governments."" 7 The
President, as the spokesman of the United States in diplomatic rela-
tions, was to be the agent of Congress, representing the will of Con-
gress as the liaison with foreign governments." 8  As such, "the Presi-
dent's power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the
idea that he is to be a lawmaker.""1
9
113. 299 U.S. at 319-20.
114. 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937). See also text accompanying note 200 infra.
115. 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1941). See also text accompanying note 201 infra.
116. Presidential Monopoly, supra note 27, at 16.
117. CoRwiN, supra note 56, at 216 n.6.
118. Presidential Monopoly, supra note 27, at 16.
119. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952); cf. Myers
v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 177 (1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[tihe duty of the
President to see that the laws be executed is a duty that does not go beyond the laws
or require him to achieve more than Congress sees fit to leave within his power"). See
also United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655, 659 (4th Cir. 1953), aff'd on
other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955); Note, Effect of Executive Agreements on Acts of
Congress, 8 U. FLA. L. REv. 216 (1955).
The Senate is fully aware of the proper sphere of action assigned to the President.
As Senator Ervin has stated:
mhe President should be the channel of communication between the United
States and foreign nations, but, in fulfilling that function, he should be merely the
executor of a power of decision that rests elsewhere, that is, in the Congress. This
was the balance of power between the President and Congress intended by the Con-
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It is interesting to note that Justice Sutherland, in his argument for
national supremacy over foreign affairs, cites the practice in use by
England at the time of the American Revolution. "During the colonial
period [international powers] were possessed exclusively by and were
entirely under the control of the Crown."'120 But in his very argument
to secure sovereign power in the national government, he denies ex-
clusive power in the executive branch.12 1 It is not clear, if ever it could
be, how the power vested in the national government was transformed
into the President's sole power.12 2  It is assumed that the power passed
stitution. This is the balance of power that Congress can enforce if it is only will-
ing to do so.
Hearings on S. 3475, supra note 71, at 6.
It is interesting to compare these notions with those of John Locke, who was of funda-
mental influence on the framing of the Constitution. In his Second Treatise on Govern-
ment Locke makes a statement that should forever serve as a warning to those advocates
of expanded Presidential power:
[Blecause it may be too great a temptation to human frailty apt to grasp at Power,
for the same Persons who have the Power of making Laws, to have also in their
hands the power to execute them, whereby they may exempt themselves from
Obedience to the Laws they make, and suit the Law, both in its making and execu-
tion, to their own private advantage, and thereby come to have a distinct interest
from the rest of the Community, contrary to the end of Society and Government:
Therefore in well order'd Commonwealths, where the good of the whole is so con-
sidered, as it ought, the Legislative Power is put into hands of divers Persons who
duly Assembled, have by themselves, or jointly with others, a Power to make Laws,
which when they have done, being separated again, they are themselves subject to
the Laws, they have made; which is a new and near tie upon them, to take care,
that they make them for the publick good.
J. LocKE, Two ' RSErss OF GOVERNMENT 410 (Laslett ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as
LocKE].
Locke also distinguished between an "executive" power and a "federative" power, the
former being directed to the execution of municipal laws within society, while the other
is concerned with the security of the public from without. The federative power, being
"much less capable to be directed by antecedent, standing, positive laws, than the Execu-
tive; and so must necessarily be left to the Prudence and Wisdom of those whose hands
it is in, to be managed for the publick good." Id. at 411. In addition, Locke suggested
that the two powers be combined in one agent. Id. at 412. McClure emphasizes this
last point, attempting to justify the power of the President to make executive agreements
as a power resulting from the two powers expressed by Locke. AGREEMENTs, supra note
5, at 411-12. He does not account for the fact that even though combined, the power
was to be exercised as the execution of laws made by the legislature.
120. 299 U.S. at 316.
121. Consider the language of Chief Justice Hughes in Monaco v. Mississippi, 292
U.S. 313 (1934):
The National Government, by virtue of its control of our foreign relations is enti-
tled to employ the resources of diplomatic negotiations and to effect such an inter-
national settlement as may be found to be appropriate, through treaty, agreement
of arbitration, or otherwise.
Id. at 331. The President is not singled out for the exclusive exercise of the power.
122. Corwin suggests that the "President's powers in the international field came early
to approximate the prerogative of the British Crown .... " WORLD ORGANMZATION,
supra note 33, at 38.
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to the President as the natural head of the government:
It is to the heads of states that representatives of other states primarily
address themselves . . since the head of state is in fact the executive,
the power and practice of contacting other governments is a prerogative
of the executive. 123
No critic of executive agreements has yet to dispute this point. It
is certainly the President who starts the negotiations, and with whom
other nations communicate. But that "power" had been circumscribed
within a sphere of limitations that precluded the President from acting
other than as a communicator. McClure, however, suggests that
"[h]istory and political science unite in bearing testimony to the fact
that the power to conduct international relations is a power pertaining
to the executive."'1 4  He then cites Blackstone and Curtiss-Wright as
his support.12  But Blackstone was talking about the powers of the
King, not about the executive branch of the United States.'
2 6
The problem is that there is virtually always a missing link in the
arguments supporting executive agreements. Their words are evi-
dence enough to show that the language of the Constitution is trans-
literated to pronounce powers for the President that were never meant
to exist. Proponents of executive agreements argue from a basis of
residual national powers to sole presidential powers. So far has Chief
Justice Marshall's notion of the President as the "sole organ" of the
national government been expanded, that 'the President is now able to
exclude other branches of government in the very exercise of power
that Chief Justice Marshall was trying to limit.'2 7
IV
While many of the arguments favoring executive agreements nor-
mally rest on some constitutional provisions empowering the President
to discharge various executive duties, a call is often made to the Suther-
123. AGREEMENTS, supra note 5, at 258.
124. Id. at 255.
125. Id.
126. Blackstone stated that
with regard to foreign concerns ... the King is the delegate or representative of
his people .... In the King therefore, as in a centre, all the rays of his people
are united, and form by that union a consistency, splendor, and power, that make
him feared and respected by foreign potentiates; who would scruple to enter into
any engagement that must afterwards be revised and ratified by a popular assembly.
What is done by the royal authority, with regard to foreign powers, is the act of
the whole nation; what is done without the king's concurrence, is the act only of
private men.
Quoted in AGREEMENTS, supra note 5, at 255 (footnote omitted).
127. See Presidential Monopoly, supra note 27, at 17.
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land reading for added support. However, having shown that the
powers of the national government are exclusive and plenary, and
further, that whatever those powers may include, they were not in-
tended to reside solely in the executive branch, it remains to consider
those explicit provisions of the Constitution which supposedly grant the
President power to enter into executive agreements. 28
Executive agreements that are authorized by Congress either prior
to an agreement, or subsequent to it, but prior to implementation can
be distinguished. 129 There is no question that the separation of powers
theory established in the Congress the sole power of legislation.8 0
The constitutional issue centers on the degree to which Congress has
transferred or acquiesced in its essential legislative functions when
delegating power to another branch of government. The distinction
is
between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily in-
volves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of
the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can
be made.13
1
The court has had ample opportunity to discuss the question of con-
gressional delegation.'3 2  In one such case, Panama Refining Co. V.
Ryan,"'3 dealing with the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933,
the Court declared invalid a portion of the Act3s on the grounds that
it was an unwarranted delegation of the legislative function to the
executive. 3 5 Chief Justice Hughes defined the issue at hand:
128. "The Supreme Court has not held any executive agreement ultra vires for lack
of Senate consent nor has it given other guidance that might define the President's power
to act alone." HENKIN, supra note 24, at 179.
129. Treaties, supra note 3, at 204-06.
130. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 36 (J. Madison). See also Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
131. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 407 (1928) quoting
Cincinnati, Wilmington & Zanesville R.R. v. Comm'rs, 1 Ohio St. 77, 88 (1852).
132. See, e.g., United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968); Carter
v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond
& Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266 (1933); United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator
Co., 287 U.S. 77 (1932); New York Cent. Sec. Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12
(1932); United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R. Co., 282 U.S. 311 (1931);
Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S. 420 (1930); Federal Trade Comm'n
v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
133. 293 U.S. 388 (1934).
134. Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 90, § 9, 48 Stat. 195, 200.
135. 293 U.S. at 420-21, 433.
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The Congress manifestly is not permitted to abdicate, or to transfer to
others, the essential legislative functions with which it is ...vested
... .The Constitution has never been regarded as denying to the
Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, which
will enable it to perform its function in laying down policies and estab-
lishing standards, while leaving to selected instrumentalities the making
of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the determination of
facts to which the policy as declared by the legislature is to apply.
...But the constant recognition of the necessity and validity of such
provisions, and the wide range of administrative authority which has
been developed by means of them, cannot be allowed to obscure the
limitations of the authority to delegate, if our constitutional system is to
be maintained.' 36
What is important is that Congress, though denied the abrogation of
its legislative function, was left free to exercise its power in establishing
policies and erecting standards which allowed the "selected instrumen-
talities" to make for themselves subordinate rules with precise limits.
In addition, the policy as formulated by Congress was to be the stand-
ard to which subsequent executing authorities were to refer. 3 7
The basis of the Curtiss-Wright case was also a question of congres-
sionally delegated powers. 8  However, in upholding the Joint Resolu-
tion of Congress authorizing the President to establish an embargo on
arms,13 9 the Curtiss-Wright Court went further and distinguished the
scope of powers to be exercised over internal as opposed to external
affairs.' 40 The Court relied upon a statement by Chief Justice Hughes
in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,' 41 asserting that in the realm of ex-
ternal affairs, for the effective execution of policies, Congress could
rightfully confide in the President "an authority which was cognate to
the conduct by him of the foreign relations of the Government."'
1 42
136. Id. at 421-22. See also Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935) (invalidating a delegation to the President to make and approve "codes of fair
competition" among business and industry). While these are the only Supreme Court
decisions invalidating congressional delegations, they are instructive in that they reaffirm
the basic principles of separation of powers, and, at the least, reestablish Congress as
the sole organ of legislative policy. See also National Cable Television Ass'n, Inc. v.
United States, 415 U.S. 336, 352 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
137. But see United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968) (after
requesting and being denied the power to regulate CATV, the FCC did so, and was up-
held by the Supreme Court).
138. 299 U.S. 304, 315 (1936).
139. 1. Res. of May 28, 1934, ch. 365, § 1, 48 Stat. 811.
140. 299 U.S. at 315-29.
141. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
142. Id. at 422, quoted in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304,
327 (1936).
1975]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
Justice Sutherland, after relieving himself of his wide-ranging dicta, a3
took notice of the "marked difference between foreign affairs and
domestic affairs," and because the former is of such far-reaching effect,
this consideration "discloses the unwisdom of requiring Congress
in this field of governmental power to lay down narrowly definite stand-
ards by which the President is to be governed. 144  The wisdom of
Sutherland's opinion, however, rests upon a distinction that he never
makes. His understanding of valid authorization of power assumes that
the delegation of power is one which gives power to make agreements,
thus granting the President some discretion. But, if the congressional
authorization is a directed action, that is, specifically directing the
President to make a certain type of agreement, then it is not a proper
authorization. When we look at the various agreements authorized by
Congress, we find that in virtually every instance the subject matter
was within the confines of congressional power.
145
But even if we accept the view that the authority was "cognate" and
beyond the realm of the enumerated powers granted Congress by the
Constitution, from where does Congress derive the power to authorize
or delegate power to the President to make executive agreements?
Clearly, Congress has no authority to negotiate with foreign powers,' 40
let alone enter into agreements. It is far from certain how Congress,
constitutionally unable to ratify a treaty, can instead authorize the
President to make an agreement. Congress could enact legislation,
under the "necessary and proper" clause, authorizing the President to
make certain agreements in fulfilling its duty to see that the powers
of the various branches are carried into execution. But, Missouri v.
Holland,47 is to be distinguished in that, in absence of the treaty en-
143. See text accompanying note 88 supra.
144. 299 U.S. at 321-22. McClure relies heavily on this position. AGREEMENTS, SU-
pra note 5, at 298.
145. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 232 (establishing post offices and
post roads); Act of July 4, 1897, ch. 11, 30 Stat. 151 (giving the President power to
make reciprocal trade agreements). The Act of July 4, 1897 was subject to judicial re-
view in B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 244 U.S. 583 (1912). The Court found that
the agreements "authorized by the Congress ...negotiated and proclaimed under the
authority of its President," were constitutional. Id. at 601. See also J.W. Hampton Jr. &
Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892). Fur-
ther examples can be found in Treaties, supra note 3, at 204-05.
146. See HENKxN, supra note 24, at 174; Treaties, supra note 3, at 203.
147. 252 U.S. 416 (1920). The case arose from the efforts of the President and Con-
gress to set certain limits on the shooting of migratory birds. After the President had
signed a treaty with Great Britain to that effect, Congress passed the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act, ch. 128, 40 Stat. 755 (1918), which was challenged by Missouri on the
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abling legislation, Congress would have no constitutional power to en-
act laws concerning the subject matter of the treaty. Congress' power,
therefore, in authorizing agreements must be limited to situations in
which it could act under its enumerated legislative powers.148
To return to a point alluded to earlier,149 Congress certainly has
within its power the right to establish precise guidelines, policies, or
standards accompanying an authorization of power.150 Indeed, the ex-
istence of such standards very often determines the issue as to whether
Congress has in fact delegated away its legislative function. 15  While
too little may be found unwarranted, it appears that the Congress is
not to be precluded from instituting "too many" guidelines, or at least
grounds that it was "an unconstitutional interference with the rights reserved to the
States by the Tenth Amendment. . . ." Id. at 436. In upholding the Act as constitu-
tional, Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court, stated that what was involved was a "na-
tional interest of very nearly the first magnitude .. I.." d. at 435. Holmes found
authority for the Act in the treaty power:
It is obvious that there may be matters of the sharpest exigency for the national
well being that an act of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty followed
by such an act could, and it is not lightly to be assumed that, in matters req .uiring
national action, "a power which must belong to and somewhere reside in every civi-
lized government" is not to be found.
Id. at 433 (citations omitted). The clear effect of the holding was to give Congress
constitutional powers "it did not possess in the absence of the treaty. But this result
is an inevitable consequence of the plenary nature of federal power over foreign affairs."
C. PnrrcHrTr, THE AMERICAN CONSTrTUTION 363-64 (1968).
148. In United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953), affd on
other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955), Chief Judge Parker declined to give effect to an
agreement by the President regulating the export of potatoes by Canada to the United
States. Judge Parker suggested that the President has no power where Congress does.
"Mhe power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce is not among the powers inci-
dent to the Presidential office, but is expressly vested by the Constitution in the Con-
gress . . . ." Id. at 659. "Parker's suggestion, it should be clear, would not only deny
to many executive agreements effect as domestic law in the United States; it denies the
President's power to make them at all." HENKIN, supra note 24, at 181 (footnote
omitted). Henkin goes further, criticizing the decision in that it drew a line between
express and implied powers of Congress "that makes little sense for any purpose." Id.
Parker does take a very strict interpretation of the President's powers, but it is instructive
to note that he cites Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952),
using the distinction between enacting laws and executing laws. 204 F.2d at 659. See
also Sutherland, The Bricker Amendment, Executive Agreements, and Imported Pota-
toes, 67 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1953); Note, Effect of Executive Agreements on Acts of
Congress, 8 U. FLA. L. REv. 216 (1955).
149. See text accompanying note 131 supra.
150. "Where the agreement is negotiated pursuant to delegated Congressional author-
ity, the legislative body may of course set limits beyond which the instrument may not
go . . . ." Treaties, supra note 3, at 206 n.51. McDougal and Lans continue, "[b]ut
within the area of allowable discretion, choice of both policy and details belongs to the
Executive." Id. See text accompanying note 144 supra.
151. See cases cited note 132 supra.
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stringent limits on the exercise of power. If a solution to future con-
gressional authorizations lies in the political process, 15 2 then Congress
should follow through with its present initiative and begin establishing,
as a practice, the use of clear guidelines, somewhat along the lines laid
out in the case of Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States."8 In at
least one situation Congress did just that,1 4 and it does not appear as
though the President could constitutionally circumvent the legislative
will of Congress should it choose to exercise its full legislative power. 5
It is generally considered appropriate for the President to enter into
executive agreements in order to make operative, or to implement, a
treaty. Numerous examples seemingly sanction this practice.'"0  It is
assumed that the use of such agreements are "indispensible to the gen-
eral conduct of diplomacy, by which the executive has sought to make
the nation's foreign policy effective."'x5 Such agreements are the out-
growth and the effectuation of a policy enunciated in a treaty. The
significant factor is the pre-existing policy upon which the agreement
is made. Where no new obligation is incurred, 158 or where no new
152. Cf. Mathews, supra note 28, passim; Treaties, supra note 3, passim.
153. 295 U.S. 495 (1935). See also T. Lowi, THE END OF LBERALiSM ch. 5 (1969);
Borchard, supra note 30, at 645.
154. See Act of June 28, 1940, ch. 440, § 14(a), 54 Stat. 681. Attorney General
Jackson, speaking on the President's authority to acquire, by agreement, naval and air
bases from Britain, stated that he found
in no other statute or in the decisions any attempted limitations upon the plenary
powers of the President as Commander in Chief. . .and as the head of the State
in its relations with foreign countries to enter into the proposed arrangement...
except the limitations recently imposed. . . . LThis limitation], it will be noted,
clearly recognizes the authority to make transfers and seeks only to impose certain
restrictions thereon.
39 Op. AT'ry GEN. 484, 489-90 (1940).
155. Consider the reasoning by Judge Parker in United States v. Guy W. Capps,
Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953), aft'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955):
The power to regulate foreign commerce is vested in Congress, not in the execu-
tive or the courts; and the executive may not exercise the power by entering into
executive agreements and suing in the courts for damages resulting from breaches
of contracts made on the basis of such agreements.
Id. at 658. See also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
156. One such example is the executive agreement to lease Guantanamo base under
a 1903 treaty with Cuba. For an extensive list of examples, see CRANDATL, supra note
41, at 102.
157. Treaties, supra note 3, at 346.
158. One of the standard justifications for executive agreements is based on whether
an obligation is established by the United States. It is thought that the consent of the
Senate is not needed for agreements that involve only obligations and concessions by
the other country. See 39 Op. ATr'y GEN. 484, 487 (1940); Smallwood v. Clifford, 286
F. Supp. 97 (D.D.C. 1968); HENmN, supra note 24, at 430 n.30.
The President's power over foreign relations while "delicate, plenary, and exclusive"
is not unlimited. Some negotiations involve commitments as to the future which
would carry an obligation to exercise powers vested in the Congress. Such Presi-
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policy is established, 159 it is thought that the President has power to
act. However, there are a number of countervailing questions which
mitigate the validity of -these claims. There is no question that treaties
are accorded the status of "law of the land,"'160 nor is there any doubt
as to the Senate's constitutional right to alter a treaty.1 ' However, it
is admitted that "numerous precedents sanction use of a simple execu-
tive agreement to alter a treaty or any other international compact."'
1 2
What is more, executive agreements are now considered to be of the
same internal legal status as treaties. 6 ' What results is a situation in
which the President could commit the United States to a policy, from
which the Senate would be unable to make changes or alterations. As
Woodrow Wilson so poignantly stated:
The President . . . may guide every step of diplomacy, and to guide
diplomacy is to determine what treaties must be made, if the faith and
prestige of the government are to be maintained. He need disclose no
step of negotiation until it is complete, and when in any critical matter
it is completed the government is virtually committed. Whatever its
disinclination, the Senate may feel itself committed also.'
64
The President, simply by his day-to-day conduct of our foreign rela-
tions, need only consummate any agreement and present it as a fait
dential arrangements are customarily submitted ... [tio the Senate before the fu-
ture legislative power of the country is committed .... It is not necessary for the
Senate to ratify an opportunity that entails no obligation.
39 Op. ATr'y GEN. 484, 487 (1940). Some commitment is normally established in re-
gard to appropriations that are needed for implementation. As yet, the House has not re-
frained from withholding money for an agreement it was not in favor of. In DeLima
v. Bidwill, 182 U.S. 1, 198 (1901), the Supreme Court avoided the question of whether
the House was required under the Constitution to appropriate money to effectuate a
treaty.
159. Undersecretary Alexis Johnson argued that the agreement with Bahrain involved
"no new policy on the part of the United States." Hearings, supra note 29, at 13. Sen-
ator Fulbright provided a contrary view: "The two agreements, with Portugal and Bah-
rain, "are not insignificant or minor questions, but ones which involve the heart of our
foreign policy. Either could possibly lead to further trouble. Accordingly, they should
be considered by the United States Senate through the regular treaty mechanisms." Id.
at 2.
160. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
199 (1795).
161. Haver v. Yaker, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 32, 35 (1869).
162. Treaties, supra note 3, at 209. On the question of "usage" creating constitu-
tional justiciability, see text accompanying note 221 infra.
163. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301
U.S. 324 (1937). However, executive agreements must respect fundamental guarantees
found in the Constitution. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (respecting right
to a jury trial); Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938) (respecting
fifth amendment rights).
164. Quoted in Presidential Monopoly, supra note 27, at 1.
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accompli. Once the Senate has consented to a treaty, it is virtually pre-
vented from exercising control over future agreements. 05
Closely tied to the question of presidential implementation is the
duty of the President to "take care that the laws be faithfully exe-
cuted." Some advocates of executive agreements have found this to
be a proper residuum of presidential power.1 6 However, it is certain
that "[o]ne of the main weaknesses of the Continental Congress and
the Congress under the Articles of Confederation was. . . its inability
to enforce treaties . . . .,17 The supremacy clause was designed to
give effect to those arrangements concluded prior to the ratification of
the Constitution. 1"" But, in addition to this, the President was em-
powered to see that the laws be executed in accordance with congres-
sional acts. We only need recall the words of Justice Black in Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,16 to see that the duty to execute
the laws refutes the idea that the President is in any way responsible
for making the laws, and indeed to do so would be violative of his con-
stitutional obligations.1
7 0
Intimately connected with claims made under the President's power
to execute the laws are claims that stem from the opening sentence
of article II, which states that "[t]he executive Power shall be vested in
a President of the United States of America." No less than the debate
centering on inherent powers,' 17 this clause has been subject to con-
stant constitutional discussion.
165. Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957) (initial senatorial consent implies con-
sent to supplementary agreements). However, it does seem possible that if the Senate
can alter a treaty, it can so change it as to prohibit types of executive agreements in
the future.
166. See Treaties, supra note 3, at 248; AGREEMENTS, supra note 5, at 312-16;
Mathews, supra note 28, at 366-70.
167. Treaties, supra note 3, at 258; see note 6 supra.
168. A distinction is made by the Supremacy Clause between "laws" and "treaties":
laws made "in pursuance" of the Constitution are to be the "supreme law," in con-
trast to treaties "made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United
States." As the differentiation in the treaty phrase between "made" and "which
shall be made" immediately suggests, the phrase was to comprehend subsisting
treaties which had been made under the Articles of Confederation, as well as post-
Convention treaties.
R. BaGm, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 234 (1969). See also id. at 369-72; Trea-
ties, supra note 3, at 259; Chirac v. Chime, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259, 271 (1817). For a
historical view of the supremacy clause and treaties, see Burr, The Treaty-Making Power
of the United States and the Methods of Enforcement as Affecting the Police Powers
of the States, 51 PROCEEDINGS AiL. PHILOSOPHICAL Soc'Y 271, 327-56 (1912).
169. 343 U.S. 579, 587-89 (1952).
170. See text accompanying note 119 supra.
171. See text accompanying note 83 supra.
[Vol. 8
EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS
The first real debate occurred between Hamilton and Madison, fol-
lowing Washington's issuance of a proclamation of neutrality at the out-
break of war between France and Great Britain in 1793. Hamilton,
writing as "Pacificus," claimed that Washington's action was defensible
in that the conduct of foreign relations was inherently an executive
function, deriving from the opening clause of article 1I.172 Madison,
under the name of "Helvidius," contended that "Pacificus" himself had
assented to the notion that whatever powers are to accrue as a result
of -the clause, they were -to be limited by the Constitution as it might
more precisely set the boundaries of the "executive power." Madison
further contended that Congress was the resting place for decisions
concerning the scope of American foreign policy173 and that the Presi-
dent's sole exclusive power was that of receiving foreign representa-
tives, "a merely 'ceremonial' power."' 74  Madison charged that Hamil-
ton's argument was, indeed, nothing more or less than a "brazen at-
tempt -to foist upon the Constitution the prerogatives of -the British
King, the very thing which -the Philadelphia Convention had thought
to forestall by the war-declaring provision."' 7  Basically, Hamilton's
position rested on an interpretation of article H, suggesting that:
The difficulty of a complete enumeration of all the cases of executive
authority, would naturally dictate the use of general terms, and would
render it improbable that a specification of certain particulars was de-
signed as a substitute for those terms, when antecedently used. The
different mode of expression employed in the constitution, in regard to
the two powers, the legislative and the executive, serves to confirm this
inference ...
The general doctrine of our Constitution then is, that the executive
power of the nation is vested in -the President; subject only to the ex-
ceptions and qualifications which are expressed in -the instrument.'
76
From this Corwin has distilled -two propositions: "[Flirst, that the
conduct of the foreign relations of a state is in its nature an executive
function and therefore, except where the Constitution provides other-
wise, belongs to the President, upon whom the Constitution bestows
'the executive power' "; secondly, the express provisions granting power
to Congress do not diminish the constitutional powers belonging to the
President.'7 7  Now, if this sounds very much like the transference of
172. See WORLD ORGANIZATION, supra note 33, at 22.
173. Id.
174. Id.; see text accompanying note 192 infra.
175. Quoted in WORLD ORGANIZATION, supra note 33, at 23.
176. Quoted in AGREEMENTS, supra note 5, at 304.
177. E. CORwIN, THE PRESIDENT'S CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 28 (1917) [here-
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power from the national government to the President mentioned
earlier,178 it is not to be a subject of wonder. Hamilton, prior to his
exposition on constitutional interpretation, talks about the President as
"the organ of intercourse between the United States and foreign na-
tions"' 9 and concludes, rightfully, that this was not a power vested
in the legislature.
While discussion about Hamilton's political psychology across the
vista of two hundred years is perhaps dangerous, it should not go un-
recognized that he was writing as "Pacificus" nearly six years after the
ratification of the Constitution. As Washington's Secretary of the
Treasury, Hamilton felt compelled, at a time when the country was just
beginning to formulate basic political policies that would carry long into
the future, to construe -the Constitution as liberally as possible, 180 pro-
viding both the necessary and probable means for meeting the demands
of a new nation.' 8' Hamilton had supported the "frail and worthless
fabric" in the Federalist because "half a loaf is better than none."
82
Hamilton's views on the Constitution are widely known, and are men-
tioned only because it gives some insight into why he considered it
necessary to expand the presidential power, reasons which are far from
what would be considered constitutionally justifiable.
But Hamilton also erred in the interpretation he gave to the opening
sentence of article H. The enumeration of presidential powers distin-
guished the powers to be exercised by the President from those that
were available to the King of Great Britain. The executive powers
of the President were seen as on par with those of the governors of
the various states.18 3 Generally, it was thought that the governors
would exercise the executive powers of government according to the
laws of the constitution of their state, and should not, under any pre-
tence, exercise any power or prerogative by virtue of any law, statute,
or custom of England.' 8 4 "'Executive power'. . . was cut off entirely
inafter cited as FOREIGN RELATIONS]. Corwin fails to take notice of the powers belong-
ing to the Congress under the "necessary and proper" clause which can vitiate any claim
to Presidential power. See text accompanying note 112 supra.
178. See text accompanying note 113 supra.
179. Quoted in AGREEMENTS, supra note 5, at 303.
180. 3 WoRxs, supra note 37, at 455; see text accompanying note 59 supra.
181. G. STOURZH, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE IDEA OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT
32 (1970).
182. C. RossrrTER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE CONSTITUTION 34 (1964) [herein-
after cited as RossrrER].
183. Presidential Monopoly, supra note 27, at 19.
184. CoRwiN, supra note 56, at 6.
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from the resources of the common law and of English constitutional
usage.' 1 8 5  The enumerated powers which followed the opening,
declaratory statement of article II were considered to be limitations on
the President's power, rather than exceptions to it.' ss
Ultimately, the questions concerning the President's power as the
stated head of the executive branch resolve themselves into nothing
more, nor less, than pronouncements on situational power and politics.
One also finds that there is a great deal of reliance on the opinion given
by Justice Sutherland in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp.,8 7 and hence one hears that "while the legislative power of the
federal government is rather clearly confined to the grants of the Con-
stitution, it is arguable that, within the national sphere of action, the
executive power of the President is unconfined."' 88  Once again Jus-
tice Sutherland's dicta has been used to stray from the actual wording,
meaning, and intention of the Constitution. Indeed, it should be re-
called that any attempt to establish in the national government exclu-
sive powers, necessarily denies such powers to the President. 89
Closely related to the President's power as Chief Executive are the
functions and duties he performs as Chief of State. Article II, section
3 grants to the President the power to "receive Ambassadors," and this
is the only sole power given to the President in terms of foreign affairs.
The Founders were explicit in their -terms governing the extent of the
President's power in -this regard. It was -to be exercised as a "particular
mode of communication . .. for the ceremony of admitting public
ministers, of examining their credentials, and of authenticating their
title."' 90  Hamilton, in discussing the "most material points of differ-
ence" between the "power of the President" and the "king of Great
185. Id. Corwin was speaking of the Virginia Constitution of 1776. Compare his
understanding of the use of British constitutional practice with that of McClure's. See
text accompanying note 5 supra.
186. Presidential Monopoly, supra note 27, at 22.
187. 299 U.S. 304 (1936); see, e.g., AGREMENmrs, supra note 5, at 323.
188. AGREEMENTS, supra note 5, at 313 (emphasis added).
189. An often cited case in support of expanded Presidential power under the opening
clause of article II is Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). Justice Sutherland's
opinion on the powers of the President as Chief Executive was relied on by Attorney
General Jackson in his support of the "destroyer-base" deal. See 39 Op. ATr'y GEN. 484,
486-87 (1940). Interestingly, and most significantly, Jackson later rejected any claim
to broad executive powers under this clause, as well as rejecting the stance taken by My-
ers. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
190. 6 1. MADISON, THE WRIiNGs OF JAMES MADISON 162 (G. Hunt ed. 1906).
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Britain,"' 1 refers to the President's authorization to receive ambassa-
dors:
[T]hough it has been a rich theme of declamation, it is more a matter of
dignity than of authority. It is a circumstance which will be without
consequence in the administration of the Government; and it was far
more convenient that it should be arranged in this manner, than that
there should be a necessity of convening the Legislature, or one of its
branches, upon every arrival of a foreign minister .... 19,
Even though granted this power, the President is not free to appoint
ambassadors. He is only to "nominate, and by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public
Ministers . . .", Nowhere was there any inclination that this
power was to be the basis for presidential prerogatives.
However, McClure argues that
presidential appointment of individuals who are not ambassadors, public
ministers, or consuls to do things that ambassadors, ministers, and con-
suls are supposed to do is nowhere forbidden. Accordingly, it seems
arguable that the practice of making such appointments . . . interprets,
perhaps amplifies, but does not necessarily amend, the (specific pro-
visions of) the Fundamental Law.'9 4
One might justifiably ask which "Fundamental Law" is being referred
to. Yet again, we find that advocates of executive agreements have
only to resort to silence on the part of the Constitution in order to make
good any claim for such agreements. Not even here is there reliance
on any "permissive" language!'95 If this position is further examined,
we also find that the President is "the organ of diplomatic intercourse,"
because of "his powers in connection with the reception and dispatch
of diplomatic agents and with treaty making . . . [and] because of the
tradition of executive power adherent to his office."' g  Thus, the
ability to dispatch executive agents, coupled with the supposedly broad
powers as Chief Executive, allows the President to conclude agree-
ments under a provision of the Constitution that was never meant to
be more than a pronouncement of a titular head of state.
The Founders were quite aware of the ability of an agent to institute,
represent, and implement the foreign policy of the United States.
191. T FEDERALIST No. 69, supra note 36, at 448.
192. Id. at 451.
193. U.S. CONST. art. IT, § 2.
194. AGREEMENTS, supra note 5, at 243.
195. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
196. Fo EIGN RELATIONS, supra note 177, at 33.
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Early in the diplomatic practice of the United States, John Jay was
called upon to negotiate and consummate a treaty with Britain. But
Jay was firmly guided and strongly influenced by the Senate. p7 Also,
Washington appointed special consuls but only with senatorial consent.
This appears to be the direct outgrowth of a practice begun under the
Continental Congress,198 and the Senate has undertaken measures to
safeguard its role in the appointing and assigning of diplomatic en-
voys."' Never was there an intention that a presidential prerogative
would be derived from the Constitution under the President's power
to receive ambassadors.
Concomitant with the President's power to receive ambassadors is
the power of recognition. The Supreme Court has provided us with
two cases in which this power became the basis for executive agree-
ments. Both United States v. Belmont'" and United States v. Pink201
dealt with the internal effect of the Litvinov Assignment, which was
an executive agreement concluded in 1933 following .the recognition
of the Soviet Union. The agreement provided for the relinquishment
by the United States of certain claims against the Soviet government
in return for a reciprocal relinquishment by the Soviet Union of all
property in this country that was in effect nationalized by the U.S.S.R.
under its government declarations of 1918 and 1919. The Court, by
197. Presidential Monopoly, supra note 27, at 15.
198. In the re-organization of the department of foreign affairs on February 22,
1782, it was provided that all communications with diplomatic officers and consular
agents. . should be conducted through the Secretary to the United States for the
department of foreign affairs; and that all instructions, communications, letters of
credence, plans of treaties and other acts . . . should . .. [be] "submitted to the
opinion of Congress"....
CRANDALL, supra note 41, at 28. See also SANDERS, supra note 55. McClure, after rec-
ognizing this situation, suggests that the practice under the Articles of Confederation of
making agreements, had a steady growth once the country had a President. Such a prac-
tice, he says, "would seem to be merely the happening of the natural and inevitable'
AGREEMENTS, supra note 5, at 261.
199. In the resolutions of January 9, 1883, advising and consenting to the ratifica-
tion of the treaty with Korea. .. on the part of the United States, by Commodor
R.W. Shufeldt, specially commissioned by the President, the Senate declared that
it did not by this act "admit or acquiesce in any right or constitutional power in
the President to authorize" any person to negotiate treaties . . . unless such person
had been appointed for such purpose or clothed with such power by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate. . . .The purpose of the declaration was to pre-
vent the means employed being drawn into precedent . . . . The Executive has
recognized no limitation in this respect.
CRANDALL, supra note 41, at 65-66. Attorney General Cushing stated that the Consti-
tution required consent of the Senate to all officers having diplomatic functions, what-
ever title or designation. 7 Op. A'T'Y GEN. 188, 192-93 (1855); see Treaties, supra
note 3, at 207 n.54.
200. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
201. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
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giving effect to the executive agreements, ipso facto established the
agreements as -the supreme law of the land. In avoiding any questions
about fifth amendment rights,20 2 the Court, in both cases, 203 reiterated
the reasoning of Justice Sutherland in Curtiss-Wright.
In Belmont, the Court argued that governmental power over ex-
ternal affairs, being vested exclusively in the national government,
grants to the executive authority to "speak as the sole organ" of that
government.20 4 Once again we are faced with arguments that grant
to the President the entire control over the conduct of foreign relations.
Once again, that power is justified through a combination of the Presi-
dent's authority as the stated head of government, and the power flow-
ing from the enumerated power of the clause establishing the "execu-
tive power."
In Pink, the Curtiss-Wright and Belmont decisions are echoed with
a ring of redundancy.205 But, something else is intimated by Justice
Douglas when he reasons that the state of New York is wrong in re-
fusing to give effect to "acts of the, Soviet Government which the
United States by its policy of recognition agreed no longer to ques-
tion."20 6  In effect, the agreement is seen as establishing new policy
on the part of the United States, and as such, it should be subject to
congressional approval. What is more, executive agreements are ac-
corded the same dignity and status as treaties, in a way, as we have
seen, totally unacceptable and violative of the Constitution and the in-
tent of the Framers.
It remains to consider what is perhaps the most far-reaching power
which the President can make claim to in justifying executive agree-
ments.107  Such power is said to derive from the President's authority
202. In Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), the Court explicitly rejected the idea that
an agreement could contravene applicable clauses of the Constitution (here, the sixth
amendment right to a jury trial). The effect of the Court's ruling is that any agreement
or treaty made, although perhaps falling under article VI, must comply with the provi-
sions of the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights, as well as any constitutional pro-
hibitions on the exercise of power. To do otherwise would permit amendments to the
Constitution in a way unacceptable to the precise method for such change as established
by the Constitution.
203. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 209 (1941); United States v. Belmont, 301
U.S. 324, 331-32 (1937).
204. 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937).
205. 315 U.S. 203, 229, 231 (1942).
206. Id. at 231.
207. "'The President shall be commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy. . .and of
the Militia of the several states, when called into actual service of the United States."
U.S. CONSr. art. I1, § 2. "In this language the Constitution confers upon the Exec-
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as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. As such, the commonly
accepted view is that the President has the express power to protect
the military security of the United States, both in -time of war and in
time of peace.20° In times of peace, the President has used executive
agreements to reduce armaments, 20 9 and in common defense with
other countries, he has used executive agreements to bolster the defen-
sive capabilities of the country.2 10 Examples abound of agreements
entered into by the President under this authority.211 While the use
of such agreements is thought to be limited to non-offensive pur-
poses, 21 2 the "plenary character and vital significance" of the Com-
mander-in-Chief clause "unite to create in its exercise by the President
a natural presupposition in favor of his authority to do anything not for-
bidden by the Constitution and lying within the field of international
affairs. 1213 With a stroke of a pen, the President can circumvent the
Constitution and critically engage the United States in the pursuit of
policy matters best left to the Congress.
If it was not clear from the Constitution that Congress was to retain
full power over the war-making policies, Hamilton's words should serve
as the epitaph for advocacy of executive agreements under the Com-
mander-in-Chief clause. Again, Hamilton is referring to the points of
difference between the King and the President:
The President is to be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the
United States. In this respect his authority would be nominally the
same with that of the king of Great Britain, but in substance much in-
utive his most formidable power with respect to the external relations of the country."
AGREEMENTS, supra note 5, at 321.
208. Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424 (1902). Yet, as Berger points out, such
power is confined by legislative delegation. Presidential Monopoly, supra note 27, at
44-45. See text accompanying note 131 supra.
209. See, e.g., the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817, Arrangement with Great Britain,
Apr., 1817, 8 Stat. 231, T.S. No. 1101/. See note 20 supra.
210. Often cited is the base destroyer deal with Britain of September, 1940. Jackson
cited this clause as his support in his letter to President Roosevelt. 39 Op. Afrr' GEN.
484, 486 (1940).
211. For extensive examples, see CRANDALL, note 41 supra; AGREEMENTS, supra note
5. See also Fraser, The Constitutional Scope of Treaties and Executive Agreements, 31
A.B.A.J. 286 (1945). Fraser, although viewing the President's power narrowly, con-
cedes a constitutional basis for agreements entered into under the diplomatic and com-
mander-in-chief powers. Id. at 288.
212. See Hearings, supra note 29, at 33, 34 (statement by Undersecretary Alexis
Johnson).
213. AGREEMENTS, supra note 5, at 321. Henkin warns that the President, as com-
mander-in-chief, could make armistice agreements which, when viewed broadly, could in-
clude war-time commitments on territorial and political issues, which would take effect
after the war, such as Yalta and Potsdam. HENmN, supra note 24, at 177.
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ferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme com-
mand and direction of the military and naval forces, as first General and
admiral of the Confederacy; while that of the British king extends to
the declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and
armies,-all which, by the Constitution . . . would appertain to the
legislature.
21 4
Thus, Congress under article I, section 8, clause 1, is to "provide for
the common Defense," and in the same section, clause 11, it shall "de-
clare War." The next clause states that Congress shall have power
"to raise and support Armies . . . ." Congress shall "provide and
maintain a Navy" and shall "provide for calling forth the Militia. .. ."
The President as Commander-in-Chief could not, initially, begin to
exercise those powers unless Congress had first acted. From where,
then, does he ascertain the power to make executive agreements?
From which provision of the Constitution is the President given the
power to make agreements, when the law-making function is explicitly
confided in the Congress?
V
Will any man, who entertains a wish for the safety of his country, trust
the sword and the purse with -a single assembly organized on principles
so defective-so rotten? Though we might give to such a government
certain powers with safety, yet to give them full and unlimited powers
of taxation and the national forces, would be to establish a despotism;
the definition of which is, a government in which all power is concen-
trated in a single body.2 15
On the basis of the growing use of executive agreements, and the
decline in the assertion of senatorial prerogatives, one might easily con-
clude that the fear of despotism and the power in the hands of one
body characterizes the executive branch. But Hamilton was referring
to the national assembly, the Congress, and he found it to be funda-
mentally defective for a want of power.2 z0 It is an ironic turn of consti-
tutional intent to find that almost two-hundred years since Hamilton
expressed his fears of an imbalance in the constitutional make-up that
had charaoterized the Continental Congress, we now find that the same
situation exists.
It is claimed that after Washington first attempted to involve the Sen-
ate in the negotiation of a treaty, an attempt that met with little suc-
214. THE FEDEILIST No. 69, supra note 36, at 448 (A. Hamilton) (emphasis added).
215. Hamilton, quoted in ROSSITER, supra note 182, at 233.
216. 3 WoRKS, supra note 37, at 203-04.
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cess, 217 the Senate's role was reduced from vicarious participation in
the making of treaties to that of "exercising a right of giving or with-
holding consent to agreements, in whose making it had played no direct
part."218 In the same breath, however, it is admitted that the President
and the Senate were to act together in the making of treaties, ,1 9 but
that "subsequent developments" have rendered the constitutional
make-up "beyond all possibility of recall. 2120  This is not to cause con-
cern, for the practice, as a product of usage, is justified because the
"treaty-clause .. . is so flexible that the exact relations of the Senate
and the executive in treaty-making could be worked out only in actual
practice. ' 221  Furthermore, the practice itself is "the most beneficial
type of constitutional change. ' 222  The reason for this is that "nine-
teenth-century inhibitions are not to be permitted to block the develop-
ment of twentieth-century usages that are believed by responsible
statesmen to promise practical aid in the attainment of objectives
deemed to be in the public interest. ' 223  But, when it is asked who
shall decide what is in the public interest, we learn that the President
and the executive branch are the most capable of determining the
course of future affairs. Such reasoning is from the start based on as-
sumptions that go unrefuted and are built upon through the aegises of
practice.224 McDougal and Lans state that the "relevant question,
when the discussion is cast in terms of usage is whether there are any
differences in policy between what has been done by way of executive
agreements and what has not been done."2 25  But, certainly, it is they
and others who have cast the discussion in terms of usage, and it is
they who rely first on usage, through practice, to then justify that very
217. Presidential Monopoly, supra note 27, at 13, points out that the only thing that
failed was the use of oral consultations, and that Washington continued to employ writ-
ten methods of informing the Senate of his actions.
218. Treaties, supra note 3, at 207 n.56. Corwin says essentially the same thing: "The
Senate's function as an executive council, was from the very beginning put, and largely
by its own election, on the way to absorption into its more usual function as a legislative
chamber . . . ." CoRwiN, supra note 56, at 211. Corwin attributes this to an insist-
ence on the part of the Senate to assert its independence in the treaty-making process.
WoRLD ORGANIZATION, supra note 33, at 36.
219. "The wording of the Constitution itself visualizes treaty-making as one contin-
uous process to be performed by a single authority, the President acting throughout in
consultation with the Senate." CoRwIN, supra note 33, at 36.
220. Id. at 34.
221. R. HAYDEN, THE SENATE AND TREATIES: 1787-1817, at ix (1920).
222. CoawiN, supra note 33, at 41.
223. AGREEMENTS, supra note 5, at 238.
224. See text accompanying note 67 supra.
225. Treaties, supra note 3, at 282 n.170.
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practice because it has been done. This type of opaque reasoning is
characteristic of those who wish to maintain that the treaty-making
clause is far from being specifically defined, and thus one is given the
mandate to alter the functions of the "government without perceptibly
affecting the vocabulary of our constitutional language. ' 2 0  It is diffi-
cult indeed to attempt to measure discernible differences between what
is and what could have been. It is precisely because we must account
for our constitutional language in light of a practice that we call into
question the very practice itself.
The question we must deal with, then, is more jurisprudential in
nature than the other problems we have so far discussed. Does a
"strict interpretation" of the Constitution, and specifically the treaty-
making clause, allow for the justification of the practice of executive
agreements as a "rule"? That is, would an interpretation which faith-
fully adheres to the text of the Constitution permit one to justify the
use of executive agreements as a historical practice constituting a rule
under the Constitution?2 7 McDougal and Lans contend that, "[]n
truth, our very survival as a nation has been made possible only because
the ultimate interpreters of the Constitution-the President and Congres-
sional leaders, as well as judges-have repeatedly transcended the re-
strictive interpretations of their predecessors. '228 So that
even if the widespread use of executive agreements in dealing with all
kinds of problems was not within the conscious contemplation of the
statesmen who foregathered at PhLadelphia 158 years ago, the continu-
ance of the practice by successii e administrations throughout our history
makes its contemporary constitutionally unquestionable.22 9
The only thing unquestionable is the acquiescence in ignoring congres-
sional prerogatives.2 30  McDougal and Lans realize this and go further
in contending that the advisory function of the Senate has been virtually
abolished by use of executive agreements.23' Is the criteria of justi-
fication simply a good result?
226. W. WiLSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 9 (1913).
227. See Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, in THEOiES OF ETMcs 144 (P. Foot ed.
1967) [hereinafter cited as Rawls].
228. Treaties, supra note 3, at 215 (footnotes omitted).
229. Id. at 291. Contrast this with what the Court said in Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486 (1969): "That an unconstitutional action has been taken before surely
does not render that same action any less unconstitutional at a later date." Id. at 546-
47.
230. The Senate clearly recognizes this. See the statement by Senator Fulbright,
Hearings, supra note 29, at 1.
231. Treaties, supra note 3, at 207-08, 304.
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The problem is -that advocates of this kind of view may be said to
translate the more specific clause of the Constitution dealing with
treaty-making into a general statement about political realism and
policy considerations.
It should, however, be no cause for wonder, since theories of consti-
tutional interpretation like other legal and governmental theories must
often serve as "handmaidens to political necessity". . . . [l-t is utterly
fantastic to suppose that a document framed 150 years ago . . . could
be interpreted today by contemporary judges in terms of the "true mean-
ing" of its original Framers .... 232
232. Id. at 214. For a similar view, see Mathews, supra note 28. At the heart
of their contention, McDougal and Lans find the Court an unwarranted agent as
the proper interpreter of the Constitution: "It would appear arguable that, just
as Congress has no authority to direct or coerce the Executive in the conduct of interna-
tional relations, so the courts have no authority to question the validity of an interna-
tional act made 'under the authority of the United States."' Treaties, supra note 3, at
299. Their citation of a portion of article VI is misplaced. The "supremacy clause"
was enacted to give effect to treaties and agreements concluded prior to ratification of
the Constitution. For an historical review of the supremacy clause, see note 168 supra.
In addition, their reasoning flies in the face of the powers given to Congress under arti-
cle I, section 8, empowering it to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into Execution" all other powers. See text accompanying note 113 supra.
Furthermore, they conclude this after citing numerous cases which say that the courts
should not interpret treaties differently from the Executive. Assuming even this, there
is no way in which we can take it to mean that the very act of establishing the agree-
ment is beyond judicial scrutiny. Finally, they suggest that the answer is a political one,
residing in the electorate, where the President is ultimately responsible.
The Supreme Court has indeed declined to decide cases involving "political questions."
Thus, even though a case be otherwise justiciable, the Court will not review such cases
"primarily because of the separation of powers within the Federal Government." Powell
v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518 (1969). In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962),
the Court laid out various considerations to be accounted for in determining if a political
question is involved:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate po-
litical department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination
of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's under-
taking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a politi-
cal decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Id. at 217. Given the test of whether there is a "textually demonstrable commitment,"
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 519 (1969), it would seem that the Senate would
have to be included in the treaty making process, and as such, the President could not
circumvent it by means of executive agreements.
Locke stated that:
The old Question will be asked in this matter of Prerogative, But who shall be Judge
when this Power is made a right use of? I Answer: Between an Executive Power
in being, with such a Prerogative, and a Legislative that depends upon his will for
their convening, there can be no Judge on Earth: As there can be none, between
the Legislative, and the People, should either the Executive, or the Legislative, when
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While there are some valid reasons for accepting such a view, 283 it is
more important to keep in mind an intrinsic characteristic of the Ameri-
can Constitution; i.e., that the Constitution is a legal document sup-
posedly transcending the fluctuations of history.28 4  To adopt an inter-
pretation of the Constitution based upon policy considerations and
"political necessity," is to abandon this intrinsic aspect of American law.
Law is not the mere implementation of governmental policies, formu-
lated in response to the dictates of the political process at the time.
One who intends to interpret the Constitution with fidelity must give
a faithful reading to the text itself.
What writers like McDougal, Lans and Mathews obscure, if not ne-
glect, is a distinction between (1) the "Constitution" as an unchanging
formal document, "describing a pattern of legal rules and institutions
that function for political purposes," and (2) the "constitution" as "a
pattern of political relationships which may be, but need not be, de-
fined in legal instruments."'238 The difference in orthography may be
understood in two ways. First, it may be viewed as the distinction be-
tween those constitutional provisions which specify and are constitutive
of the governmental institutions and power processes, and those "situa-
tional powers" implied by the Constitution in the establishment of a
federal system of separate institutions sharing power "autonomously"
they have got the Power in their hands, design, or go about to enslave, or destroy
them. The People have no other remedy in this, as in all other cases where they
have no Judge on Earth, but to appeal to Heaven.
LocKE, supra note 119, at 425-26.
In B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583, 600-01 (1912), the Court viewed
as part of its constitutional responsibility, the right to review "constructions of interna-
tional compacts." Certainly, the doctrine of political questions must be accounted for,
but it seems that the Court could, if it feels it is within its function and power, make
executive agreements subject to constitutional justification. There is nothing inherent in
the question of executive agreements that would preclude the Court from exercising this
function, and certainly it is preferable to the solution suggested by Locke. See Note,
Executive Agreements and the Treaty Power, 42 COLuM. L. R1v. 831, 832-33 (1942).
233. On one hand, there is political realism, recognizing the expediency of the
President in international affairs; on the other hand, one must realize the difficulty of
interpreting the intention of the Framers, which involves an interpretation of the social-
psychology of the Framers.
234. Miller states that "[liegal theory is presumably indifferent to time." MILLER, sU-
pra note 2, at 160. Corwin understands the distinction being made:
The fact that the Constitutional Document has not been greatly altered by formal
amendment so far as the make-up and powers of the National Government are con-
cerned ought not to be permitted to obscure the further fact that the working consti-
tution to which the Document lends legal and moral sanction has from the first
undergone constant changes.
WORLD ORGANIZAT7ON, supra note 33, at 37 (emphasis added).
235. MILLER, supra note 2, at 150 (emphasis added).
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though "interdependently. '23 6  Second, this orthographical difference
may be viewed as embracing the distinction, made by Ronald Dworkin,
between a "strict interpretation" of the Constitution as giving a faithful
adherence to the text itself; and a strict or narrow interpretation as
viewing in a limited way the various rights and privileges delineated
in the Constitution, given the political necessities and policy considera-
tions of the time.
237
Thus, writers who attempt to justify executive agreements upon
historical practice seem to be construing the constitution, and applying
a "strict interpretation" of the Constitution in the latter of Dworkin's
senses. Part of the problem with this kind of argument and interpre-
tation is that it fails to distinguish between a "concept" and a "con-
ception." Adherence to the constitution views the Constitution as an
historically evolving, or evolutionary document; and interpretations
based upon fidelity to policy considerations, must be made upon "spe-
cific conceptions" as founded in the constitutional provisions, such as
the treaty-making clause. Hence, interpreters of the Constitution,
be they presidents, congressional leaders, or judges, only substi-
tute and evolve their conceptions of the provisions of the Consti-
tution. Consequently, the Constitution may be said to permit whatever
it does not strictly prohibit.23 And that which it does "permit" is to
be interpreted according to historic usage and contemporary concep-
tions of the provisions of the Constitution.239 In this connection,
McDougal and Lans state that changes by usage "furnish ample proof
of the proposition that the Constitution may be modified or supple-
mented by practice in any desired manner, except where there are ex-
press prohibitions in the text of the document. '240  Clearly, however,
here they are talking in terms of the constitution and not the Constitu-
tion. In addition, what they negleot is the fact that the "vague"' clauses
of constitutional provisions must be interpreted according to ,the Con-
stitution, which must be seen as a timeless document, providing "con-
cepts" which are guides for the workings of the constitution and the
institutions established under it.2 41  As Justice Holmes stated: "[Any]
case before us must be considered in the light of our whole experience
236. Id. at 150-61.
237. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 26.
238. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
239. Id.
240. Treaties, supra note 3, at 306.
241. See Dworkin, supra note 2, at 27.
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and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago,"242 but
also the concepts of constitutional provisions must be interpreted "by
considering their origin and the line of their growth. '243  As Miller
states:
the Court's most successful attempt to overcome the problems of con-
stitutiional intent and constitutional change. . . recognizes that the Con-
stitution does not usually change according to its own plan of amend-
ment, yet constitutional change is continual. When the Constitution is
discussed in terms of a -theory (that of evolution) to which change itself
is integral, then the "Constitution" has become once more the "constitu-
tion" that John Marshall said he was expounding. And yet justices
have by no means surrendered their "sworn duty to construe the Con-
stitution. . . to effectuate the intent and purposes of the Framers.
2 4
What Miller says about constitutional intent and change within the
context of judicial review is clearly something quite different from that
of advocates of executive agreements. What these advocates lack is
a concise theory of constitutional interpretation that would make lucid
the concepts embedded in the Constitution. Instead, they substitute
their own form of "strict constructionism" based upon policy considera-
tions and political expediency which serves as a guide and standard for
what they conceive to be the conceptions of the Framers' non-prohibi-
tory clauses and provisions. Such an argument can only be given if
one abandons a "strict interpretation" and adherence to the constitu-
tional text itself.
In addition to these problems of interpretation, and theories of
meaning and intention, the position advocating the practice of execu-
tive agreements as constituting a constitutional practice or "rule" is it-
self muddled. First, in maintaining this position the advocate must be
talking about the constitution and not the Constitution. Secondly, and
more importantly, their notion of usage as constituting a "rule" is not
the conception of a rule as a "practice," but it is really what John Rawls
terms the "summary view of a general rule. '2 45 The "summary view"
of a general rule is such that particular cases are logically prior to
rules; and the "rules are formulated to serve as aids in reaching these
ideally rational decisions on particular cases, guides which have been
built up and tested by the experience of generations. 240  Contrast,
242. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
243. Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914).
244. MILLER, supra note 2, at 169, quoting Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 288-89
(1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
245. Rawls, supra note 227, at 158. See also id. at 160-67.
246. Id. at 162. Henkin suggests that "ad hoe" agreements governing single instances
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however, the conception of rules as practices, which recognizes the
rules as defining and constituting the practice. As Rawls states "the
rules of practices are logically prior to particular cases. ' 247
Those engaged in a practice recognize the rules as defining it. The
rules cannot be taken as simply describing how those engaged in the
practice in fact behave: it is not simply that they act as if they were
obeying the rules. Thus, it is essential to the notion of a practice that
the rules are publicly known and understood as definitive. . . . On this
conception, then, rules are not generalizations from the decisions of in-
dividuals .... 248
VI
What then can be said for executive agreements? It seems clear
that the Framers, in enacting the specific language of the treaty-making
provisions, intended to guard against the practice of Presidential agree-
ments. The use of executive agreements as a method for circumventing
the specific "rules" of the Constitution cannot be justified by resort to
long-standing practice. Nor, as we have seen can the proponents of
executive agreements find support in other constitutional provisions
which grant power to the President. While it cannot be denied that
the position of the United States in world affairs is today far different
from that which existed when the Document was first established,
fidelity to the Constitution demands that the Senate be made a part of
the process by which the United States commits itself to international
agreements. The Founders provided for such participation, and as
such, there can be no justifying a contrary practice by a set of so-called
rules that are themselves ultimately responsible to the constitutional
text.
Lee B. Ackerman
would rarely require senatorial consent. HENMN, supra note 24, at 432 n.39. However,
in Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936), the Court seemingly
rejected an "ad hoc" agreement as making law for a particular case.
247. Rawls, supra note 227, at 163.
248. Id.
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